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ANN BERKLEY RODGERS* and ALBERT E. UTTON**

The Ixtapa Draft Agreement
Relating to the Use of
Transboundary Groundwaters t
The law and institutions for the management and equitable distribution
of groundwaters have been slow to develop.' This is particularly true of
transboundary aquifers. At the international level, "references to groundwaters are scant and too limited in scope to propose them in terms of
customary law." 2 International practice and international law principles
related to "'shared' groundwater resources are fragmentary" 3 at best.
In regard to groundwater we are faced more with "a case of nonmanagement than of mismanagement. 4 This striking absence of law and
institutions for dealing with transboundary groundwaters is on a collision
course with greatly increasing demands being placed on those water
supplies by rapidly increasing populations. Estimates of world population
vary, and factors which may influence that growth are numerous, but the
extent of current population growth has to be the single, most salient
factor affecting both water supply and water quality.'
Increased population means increased competition for water. In particular, competition for groundwater supplies is increasing at a rapid rate.
Already, in many countries, great reliance is placed upon groundwater.
Israel relies upon groundwater for more than two-thirds of all the water
used in the country, and in Europe more than three-fourths of the public
water supply comes from groundwater sources in Denmark, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands. In Tunisia and Belgium, nine
out of every ten people are dependent upon underground sources, and
the aquifers surrounding many major cities are becoming severely depleted as the withdrawals exceed the natural recharge of the aquifer. For
*Research Lawyer, Natural Resources Center, University of New Mexico.
**Professor of Law, University of New Mexico.
'The co-sponsorship and financial assistance of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and the New
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1. For a more complete discussion see Utton, The Development of International Groundwater
Law, 22 NAT. RES. J. 95 (1982) and INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW (Teclaff & Utton eds.
1981). Hayton, The Groundwater Legal Regime as Instrument of Policy Objectives and Management,
2 ANNALES JURIS AQUARUM 272, 275 (1976).
2. Caponera & Alheritiere, Principles of InternationalGroundwater Law, 18 NAT. REs. J.589,
618 (1978).
3. Id. at 610.
4. Hayton, supra note 1,at 275.
5. United Nations, World Population Prospects, 1965-2000, As Assessed in 1968, U.N. Doc.
ESAIP/WR (1968); L. BROWN, By BREAD ALONE 35 (1974).
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example, London, Copenhagen, Hamburg, Basel, and Vienna are urban
areas in Europe which face a chronic problem of falling groundwater
levels. 6 In Africa, most of the capital cities are heavily dependent on
groundwater sources for their water supplies. As a result wells in many
coastal areas in Africa have been overexploited, resulting in the intrusion
of sea water. In Latin America, major cities have looked more and more
to groundwater as the least expensive means of obtaining water, and
shortages of surface waters (accentuated by prolonged droughts) have
stimulated farmers in arid and semiarid regions to expand the use of
groundwater, particularly in those areas which do not have reliable surface
water supplies. Again, the result often has been the overpumping of
aquifers and the consequent deterioration of water quality which generally
occurs when the water pressure of the aquifer is reduced thus allowing
the intrusion of overlying saline waters. 7
The experience in North America has been similar to that in Africa,
Europe, and Latin America, and it has been observed that "the general
picture is one of more recent resort to groundwater, except in arid zones,
without an adequate understanding of the physics of the resource and
without regard, generally speaking, for the future." 8
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW
Society has responded slowly to the need to manage and equitably
distribute groundwater. Hayton points out:
[B]ecause law, and governments, respond (with few exceptions) only
to felt needs of a society it comes as no surprise that traditionally
there has been a failure to focus on the regulation and management
of groundwater use in most legal systems. Demand for regulatory
action simply has not been insistent. 9
It has truly been a case of groundwater being out of sight and out of
mind.
The laws governing groundwater are inadequately developed generally.
"[Tiraditionally there has been a failure to focus on the regulation and
management of groundwater in most legal systems.""° Professor Robert
Emmet Clark adds that "legislative attention to the physical relationship
between surface and groundwater sources is scarcely older than the concern for pollution."" The primary attention of domestic water law has
6. Teclaff, Abstraction and Use of Water: A Comparison of Legal Regimes, U.N. DOC. ST/ECH/
154 at 62 (1972).
7. Hayton, supra note 1, at 274.
8. Id. at 275.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Clark, Western Groundwater Law, in 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 411 (R. Clark ed. 1972).
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focused on surface water, and there is a very limited groundwater practice
at the international level.
"[T]he problem, then, ...
is to fashion a legal regime and a management machinery'12 which will be integrated in order to achieve the
optimum use of a nation's, or a region's, total water resources. In order
to ensure the efficient use and distribution of available water resources,
institutions must be developed to manage the world's water resources
rationally. This is especially true of groundwater where the development
of laws and institutions has been much slower than that for surface water.
At the national level trends are changing and more attention is being
paid to the regulation of groundwater, although in most countries groundwater is still a separate legal regime. 3 However, even with the increased
attention being given to groundwater, the modern legislation in most
countries is inadequate. At the national level, "we are still faced . . .
with unsatisfactory results. . . . The difficulties that have faced us in this
field still persist: problems of supply, of quality, of the impact of surface
waters, and the social, political and economic consequences of the still
deteriorating conditions. " 4
THE "COMMONS" OF TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS:
SOME ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF UNCONTROLLED
COMPETITION
Transboundary aquifers present many of the "Tragedies of the Commons" experienced in exploiting other common resources such as fisheries
on the high seas. 5 Since the resources are owned in common, that is,
owned by everyone, yet owned by no one, there is no regulation, no
security of legal rights, and no protection from the exploitation of the
resource by others.
In the case of transboundary groundwaters, no party sharing the aquifer
can have the assurance of a fair share of the waters of the aquifer or that
the waters will be of a useable quality. Because groundwater is mobile,
other users can take possession of the resource without regard to political
boundaries. A strong economic incentive, moreover, exists to exploit the
resource as quickly as possible, before the mobile fluid resource is captured by others-in a phrase, there is a strong incentive to race "each
other to the bottom of the aquifer."' 6
12. Hayton, supra note 1, at 293.
13. Id. at 278.
14. Id. at 284.
15. G. HARDIN, & J. BADN, MANAGINGTHECOMMONS (1977); Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons,
162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (Presidential Address to Pacific Division of American Association for the
Advancement of Science).
16. Hansen, Economic Growth Patterns in the Texas Border Lands, 22 NAT. RES. J. 805, 819
(1982).
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In an uncontrolled transboundary aquifer:
[The d]efinite property rights belong only to those who are in possession-that is, who gets there "fustest with the mostest." Every
user tries to protect himself against others by acquiring ownership
through capture in the fastest possible way. Deferred use is always
subject to great uncertainty; others may capture the resource in the
meantime.
A common property resource has been defined as one which may be
used by many different users, "none of which have any well defined
rights to any specific amount in the common pool."' 8 In this unregulated
situation the various users have
[no] incentive to extract the resource at a rate that maximizes its
value over time. The operative rule is simple: Use it or lose it. This
rule follows from the obvious notion that if one reduces production
or extraction rates today in order to have more of the resource available tomorrow when resource values are higher, there is nothing to
prevent other users from extracting the "saved" resource. In the
absence of well-defined (and enforced) property rights, extraction
costs impose the only limit on extraction rates-potential future uses
and values are irrelevant inasmuch as future rights or access to the
resource do not exist.19
Veeman adds that
[iun the absence of effective social institutions to guide resource use,
private groundwater use can be predicted eventually to generate excessive investment and extraction costs; induce a pumping rate which
is greater than socially optimal, and which may lead to irreversible
depletion; dissipate economic rent or producer surplus; and in general
create economic waste and resource inefficiency.2"
In sum the effect of unregulated human actions makes the supply less
reliable for all users. There is incentive for each user to protect himself
from his neighbor's actual or potential pumping by capturing as much of
the "fugitive resource" as quickly as possible. Because the movement
of water within an aquifer does not respect political boundaries, a state's
or a country's groundwater supply may be depleted and its economic
development retarded by development of the same groundwater supply.
17. S. CIRIACY-WANTRUP, RESOURCE CONSERVATION, ECONOMICS AND POLICIES, 142 (3d ed.
1968).
18. Muys, Cummings & Burke, Interstate Groundwater Management, 56 (paper prepared for
Western Governor's Policy Office 1984).
19. Id.
20. Veeman, Water Policy and Water Institutions in Northern India: The Case of Ground Water
Rights, 18 NAT. RES. J. 569 (1978).
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The economic incentive for over-development and, consequently, the
over-investment in pumping capacity leads to the depletion of the resource. In the process, lift distances and, therefore, pumping costs are
increased for the later user. Both economic waste and resource waste are
the likely results of inadequate legal protection of water rights. In addition,
the water quality of the aquifer may be affected adversely by human
activities on the other side of a political boundary, including pumping
which can lower the water pressure allowing the intrusion of saline waters.
In order to avoid such adverse consequences before they occur, a central
challenge is laid down to design mechanisms that will:
1. insure each party a fair share of the use of transboundary groundwaters.
2. encourage the prudent use of the resource over time.
3. resolve potential and actual disputes over the use of the resources,
and
4. protect the underground environment of the aquifers. 2'
All this suggests that as populations increase, as economic development
advances, the need to regulate the use of transboundary groundwaters
increases. Rational management requires the formulation of water policies
aimed at the preservation of the resource, particularly in view of its high
vulnerability to long-lasting contamination or salt water intrusion and its
very slow recharge and movement in many cases.
Along with new policies affecting groundwater there must be established adequate administrative machinery to carry out the management
tasks. 23 The resulting integrated management should be designed bearing
in mind that there are peculiar physical characteristics of the movement
and availability of groundwater that require special regulations and coordinated management with surface waters. The ultimate challenge is for
specialists, working with other disciplines and administrators, to fashion
legal regimes and management machinery which can prudently manage
national as well as transboundary groundwater resources.
DEVELOPMENTS IN TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATER LAW
A. Treaty Practice
Caponera and Alheritiere, after surveying international treaty practice,
were unable to find any decisions of international courts specifically on
21. For example, Sepulveda suggests that groundwater is "one of the questions which can most
affect diplomatic relations between Mexico and the United States in the latter part of the Twentieth
Century." Los Recursos Hidraulicos en la zona Fronteriza Mexico-Estados Unidos. Perspectiva de
la Problematica Hacia El Ano 2000-Algunas Recomendaciones, 22 NAT. REs. J. 1081 (1982).
22. Hayton, supra note 1, at 287.
23. Id.
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the question of groundwater.2 ' However, they anticipate a more rapid
development of groundwater law and institutions for two principal reasons: first, the nature of the resource itself makes it an ideal subject for
international cooperation and second, because groundwater resources are
becoming so important in supplying the world's needs for water.25
Groundwater, like surface water, often transcends political boundaries,
and there are many large aquifers which are shared by several countries.
For example, the Northeastern African aquifer underlies Libya, Egypt,
Chad, and Sudan, and on the Arabian peninsula there are the aquifers
shared by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and perhaps Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates. These aquifers, being in arid areas, are absolutely essential for
the development of industry and agriculture. Other important international
aquifers are the northern Sahara Basin shared by Algeria, Tunisia, and
Libya, and the Chad aquifers shared by Chad, Niger, Sudan, and the
Central African Empire, Nigeria and Cameroon. There are also the Taoudeni Basin in Chad, Egypt, Libya, and the Sudan, and the Maestrichian
Basin shared by Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, and Mauritania. These
groundwater basins are in arid and semiarid areas, are divided by international boundaries, and are likely to be the subject of increasing development.
The development of international law and legal institutions for managing groundwater resources and for resolving disputes is in its infancy.26
There are but a handful of international treaties which refer to groundwater
specifically. For example, Minute 242 under the 1944 treaty between the
United States and Mexico27 restricts groundwater pumping on one segment
of the boundary. Other examples are the 1925 Agreement between Egypt
and Italy on the Ramba Well, 28 the 1927 Convention and Protocol between
the USSR and Turkey regarding the use of frontier waters, 29 and the 1947
treaty of peace between the Allies and Italy which outlines guarantees
between Italy and Yugoslavia concerning springs in the Commune of
Gorizia.3 ° Also there is the 1958 agreement between Yugoslavia and
Bulgaria "1and the 1955 Yugoslav-Hungarian Water Economy Commission Mission Agreement.3 2 There are also treaties between Czechoslovakia
24.
25.
26.
27.
1219,
28.

Caponera & Alheritiere, supra note 2, at 618.
Id. at 591.
Id.
Treaty on Utilization of Waters, Feb. 3-Nov. 14, 1944, United States-Mexico, 59 Stat.
T.S. No. 944.

SER.
29.
30.
31.
32.

B/12, Treaty No. 6 [hereinafter cited as TEXTS & TREATY PROVISIONS].
Id. at 384 (Treaty No. 106):
Id. at 415 (Treaty No. 120). See also id. at 866 (Treaty No. 236).
Id. at 558 (Treaty No. 161).
Id. at 830 (Treaty No. 228).

UNITED NATIONS, LEGISLATIVE TEXTS AND TREATY PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE UTILIZATION
OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS FOR OTHER PURPOSES THAN NAVIGATION 99 (1963), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/
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and Poland,33 between Poland and the U.S.S.R.," and between Poland
and the Democratic Republic of Germany,35 as well as the 1972 convention
between Switzerland and Italy concerning water pollution control.36 Even
in these treaties, however, groundwater is usually only a secondary issue
which is mentioned almost in passing.
B. Interstate Practicein Federal Countries
Perhaps one of the most fruitful sources of nourishment for the development of transboundary groundwater law is the interstate practice in
federal countries. Although not technically international practice, the decisions of the courts in countries like the United States, Canada, the
Federal Republic of Germany, and Switzerland nonetheless have been
influential in the development of international surface water practice.
Interstate practice, moreover, provides a potentially rich reference for
international law in the development of groundwater at the international
level. Switzerland, Germany, Canada, Yugoslavia, India, Argentina, and
the United States provide considerable experience which reflects a variety
of approaches 37 in regard to transboundary surface waters. The groundwater practice, however, is limited.
The richest field for transboundary groundwater law is the United
States' experience, but even so the United States' experience is also quite
scanty. Thirty-five interstate compacts have been enacted regarding water
management, but, in fact, very few of them deal with groundwater.3"
Generally, the goal of the interstate compact is the allocation of water
between the various signatory states and, generally, the compact refers
to surface water only.
Several interstate compacts now, however, do refer to groundwater.
The Lower Niobrara River and Ponca Creek Compact apportions resources shared by Nebraska and South Dakota, and the Upper Niobrara
River Basin Compact apportions water resources shared by Nebraska and
Wyoming. 3 The Upper Niobrara River Compact explicitly recognizes the
interdependencies of groundwater withdrawals and surface stream flow.
The compacts of the Delaware' and Susquehanna River Basins are of
33. Agreement Concerning the Use of Water Resources in Frontier Waters, March 21, 1958,
Czechoslovakia-Poland, 538 U.N.T.S. 89.
34. Agreement Concerning the Use of Water Resources in Frontier Waters, July 17, 1964, PolandU.S.S.R., 552 U.N.T.S. 175.
35. S.D.R. Gesetzblatt, Jul. 20, 1967.
36. Convention of April 20, 1972, Italy-Switzerland, Rev. Gen. de Droit Int'l Publ. 265 (1975).
37. Caponera & Alheritiere, supra note 2, at 604. See also S. JAIN & A. JACOB, INTERSTATE WATER
DisPuTEs IN INDIA (1971); and Interstate Water Disputes Act of India, 4(1) (1956).
38. J. MUYS, INTERSTATE COMPACTS (1971).
39. Act of Aug. 4, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-52, 83 Stat. 86 (1969).
40. Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961).
41. Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970).
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particular interest." Professor Clark observes that "The Delaware and
Susquehanna Compacts of 1961 and 1970 have gone the farthest in providing a legal framework for management of surface and groundwaters
across state lines." 42 The Delaware River Compact grants broad powers
to its Commission. The Commission has the power to equitably apportion
"the waters of the basin . ..and to impose conditions,
obligations and
45
44
release requirements." 43 It can veto water projects, control pollution,
promulgate "rules, regulations and standards, '4 6 issue orders "to cease
the discharge" of pollutants 47 and take legal action "in its own name...
to compel compliance ... ."148
A number of United States Supreme Court decisions have dealt with
interstate surface waters 49 but few related to interstate groundwaters until
recently." The Sporhase case and the federal district court El Paso case
have now focused attention on transboundary groundwater allocation."
In sum, there is helpful but limited interstate practice in federal systems.
At the international level there is little guidance provided by the meager
international treaty practice.
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Considering the increasing competition for groundwater and the admonition that "economic development presupposes the protection of adequate legal guarantees ... ,"" how do we provide users who are dependent
on groundwater a secure supply? How may transboundary groundwaters
be protected from contamination? The U.N. Water Conference has exhorted countries sharing water resources to "review existing and available
techniques for managing shared water resources, and coordinate development of such resources." 53 Yet being aware that groundwater, because
42. Clark, Institutional Alternatives for Managing Groundwater Resources: Notes for a Proposal,
18 NAT. RES. J. 153, 157 (1978).
43. Pub. L. No. 87-328 § 3.3, 75 Stat. 688 (1961).
44. Id. at §3.8.
45. Id. at §5.2.
46. Id.
47. Id. at § 5.4.
48. Id.
49. Clark, supra note 42, at 157.
50. See, e.g., Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936).
51. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 3456 (1982); City of El Paso v. Reynolds,
563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983). See DuMars, New Mexico Water Law:An Overview and Discussion
of Current Issues, 22 NAT. RES. J. 1045, 1057 (1982); Tarlock, So, It's Not "Ours"-Why Can't
We Still Keep It? A First Look at Sporhase v. Nebraska, 18 LAND & WATER L. REV. 137 (1983);
Corker, Problems of Interstate Allocation of Groundwater, GROUNDWATER: ALLOCATION, DEVELOPMENT, POLLUTION (Univ. of Colo. 1983).
52. JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 172 (1958).
53. Report of the United Nations Water Conference, E 77, II Annexes (Agenda Item 12), at 51
(1977).
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of its association with that sovereignty which has always attached itself
to land, "may be the very last element of the environment to be considered," 54 what suggestions can be made to improve the security of water
supply and thereby the investment of transboundary groundwater users?
How can we ensure that each party will receive a fair share of the transboundary resources in the border region, adequately protected so as to
avert unnecessary and damaging conflict? How can we avoid what has
been called "education by disaster?" 55
THE IXTAPA WORKING GROUP: SOME THRESHOLD SUGGESTIONS
In an attempt to respond to these questions and others regarding the
development of transboundary law and institutions, a small, multi-disciplinary working group of water resources specialists has met over a
period of three years to prepare a draft agreement for the allocation and
management of transboundary groundwaters. The Working Group wrestled with the problems of allocation and regulation, and debated and
exchanged views from the vantage point of different disciplines. They
did not meet with the idea of dictating to governments, but rather worked
to explore the kinds of problems which may be encountered in the sharing
of transboundary aquifers, and in the process to make some suggestions
as to how the allocation and regulation issues might be addressed. They
did not intend to lay out a definitive blueprint, but rather to provide some
threshold thinking which, in turn, may stimulate others to explore the
issues further. In so doing, it is the hope of the Working Group to advance
the understanding of the allocation and prudent use of transboundary
groundwaters which is at a pioneering stage. In short, it is an attempt to
address the problems before the crisis is upon us.
The Working Group met in Mexico twice at Ixtapa and once at Puerto
Vallarta, and provided numerous written commentaries over a period of
three years as the draft was repeatedly revised. The Working Group
undoubtedly reflected their experience with the U.S.-Mexican border
region in particular. The conditions and institutions along the U.S.-Mexico frontier were used as a working example by the Group. The Ixtapa
draft, therefore, might be most relevant to that region. However, the draft
agreement is not directed exclusively at any specific frontier, and it is
hoped that it will be of broader relevance.
The group was far from complete agreement on many issues, and no
single member would agree with every word of this revision. The rapporteurs labored valiantly to consider and respond to the comments of
54. L. Teclaff & E. Teclaff, TransboundaryGroundwater Pollution:Survey and Trends in Treaty
Law, 19 NAT. REs. J. 629, 667 (1979).
55. Clark, supra note 42, at 157.
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the group and are responsible for any failures to accurately reflect the
thinking of the participants. We have tried to indicate the diversity of
thinking on particular issues in the comments to the draft agreement. We
think it is as important to display the spectrum of opinion as it is to report
general consensus. In so doing we hope to stimulate and be of assistance
in the further exploration of mechanisms for sharing transboundary
groundwaters fairly and prudently, while minimizing conflict over their
use.
The members of the Ixtapa Working Group were:
Thomas G. Bahr (Limnologist), New Mexico Water Resources
Institute
F. Lee Brown (Economist), University of New Mexico
Randall J. Charbeneau (Engineer), University of Texas at Austin
Robert Emmet Clark (Lawyer), University of Arizona
Ronald G. Cummings (Economist), University of New Mexico
Charles T. DuMars (Lawyer), University of New Mexico
Leonard B. Dworsky (Engineer), Cornell University
Roger L. Eldridge (Policy Analyst), Colorado Commission on
Higher Education
Enzo Fano (Economist), Chief, Water Resources Bureau, United
Nations
Robert D. Hayton (Lawyer), Hunter College
Helen Ingram (Political Scientist), University of Arizona
Will Knedlik (Lawyer), Lincoln Institute for Land Policy
George O'Connor (Biologist), New Mexico State University
Ann Berkley Rodgers (Lawyer), Natural Resources Center,
University of New Mexico
Stanley R. Ross (Historian), University of Texas at Austin
Cesar Sepulveda (Lawyer), Bonn, Germany
Ross Shipman (Geologist), University of Texas at Austin
Alberto Szekely (Lawyer), El Colejio de Mexico
Ludwik A. Teclaff (Lawyer), Fordham University
Jose Trava (Engineer), Centro de Estudios Fronterizos del Norte
de Mexico
Albert E. Utton (Lawyer), University of New Mexico
and others

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
In approaching the task of drafting a hypothetical transboundary agreement, the Working Group formulated some threshold premises including
the following:
1. There must be conjunctive management of surface and groundwater
in areas where supplies are interrelated. In the management of transboundary groundwaters it is essential to recognize the interrelationships
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between surface and groundwaters, which are frequently interconnected.
Contrary to hydrologic reality, the law frequently has made distinctions
which separate surface water from underground waters; these distinctions
have failed to recognize interrelationships between surface and underground waters.
2. Legal rights should take into account the hydrologic fact that water
is a fugitive resource. Therefore, the legal rights are to the control and
use of the water, not the ownership of the water.
3. Decisions such as the spacing of wells and the rate of drawdown
need to be carried out according to a reasoned development scheme.
4. Hydrologic information needs to be developed carefully in order to
plan for the use of the supply over a calculated period, to determine
sustained yield, and to prevent salt water intrusion.
a. There should be a system of measurement of withdrawals from
wells.
b. Records must be kept of withdrawals over a period of time.
5. Controls must be placed on drilling in those areas where present
and future uses may be endangered.
6. Allocation procedures, including permits, must be flexible in order
to anticipate and minimize conflicts and shortages and to facilitate transfers to other uses.
7. The planning process should be flexible enough to allow for planned
depletion over a calculated period by certain uses such as irrigation or
municipal water supply. The planned depletion or mining of water can
be justified in the same way as the mining of nonrenewable mineral
resources such as oil, coal, or copper. The decision to mine, however,
has to be made after thorough investigation and the development must
be orderly and rational. This is particularly so where the groundwater
resource is divided by an international boundary, because depletion of
the resource and the consequent damage to the other country cannot be
easily corrected by natural recharge.
8. The management effort must include and be related to all water
quality matters.
9. Management should be placed in an agency with authority which
is broad enough to carry out the policies of the parties concerned and
strong enough to enforce the policies designed for particular groundwater
areas along and near the border.
10. The use of groundwater resources divided by political boundaries
may be equitably apportioned and in that apportioning, shared groundwater may be treated in the same manner as shared surface water.
11. The amount and quality of groundwater available to the affected
countries within their shared international drainage basins and from shared
groundwater aquifers should be included as elements in the determination
of an equitable apportionment of their shared water resources.
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12. The allocation of shared groundwater should not be determined
by parties acting unilaterally, but rather the parties should determine
through amicable deliberations and negotiation their respective rights to
shared natural resources.
13. The actual allocation, administration, and enforcement of water
rights as to each party's portion of water in a transboundary groundwater
conservation area would be within the jurisdiction of that party and its
appropriate political subdivisions.
14. In addition, there should be a general supervisory power lodged
in the Commission to ensure that each party abides by its obligations.
15. In the event of prolonged drought the Commission should be authorized to use transboundary groundwaters as drought reserves.
16. The Draft Agreement is based on the sovereign power of nations
to enter into agreements. Thus, in large part, political and institutional
implications of the draft agreement that are intra-national in character are
not discussed. While the issues of how local or provincial support for a
treaty within a nation is to be gained and how the provisions are to be
implemented are important, they are not addressed in this draft. Absent
knowledge of specific parties and circumstances such matters are difficult
to anticipate and analyze. Some flavor for such implications is considered
in the comments pertaining to specific provisions of the Draft Agreement.
THE IXTAPA DRAFT AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE USE OF
TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATERS
PREFACE
This Draft identifies issues which we think should be considered in
agreements concerning the management of transboundary groundwater
basins. Persons involved in this effort are from universities and organizations which have interests in the equitable management of natural resources. We recognize that the process of negotiating fair rules for managing
any resource which may be in severely deficient supply demands great
skill and diplomacy of persons officially representing the various interests
and constituents.
The laws concerning water and other natural resources differ from
nation to nation. Physical conditions, economies and customs vary greatly.
Customs and traditions may not have legal weight, but they are factors
that wise diplomats may find difficult to ignore. These and other factors
mean that the successful negotiation of international water agreements is
a most difficult task.
Those of us who contributed to this document do not represent any
government. Moreover, we recognize that our work only covers concepts
which we believe are worthy of consideration in international or interstate
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agreements concerning groundwater resources which are divided by political boundaries. We present options when sensitive and difficult issues
are addressed. Nonetheless, we know that potential conflicts arise when
negotiators hammer out agreements which cannot include the "easy solution" of offering options. Although such agreements may be difficult
to achieve, we believe that failure to work patiently and fairly to achieve
them can serve no purpose and can lead to abusive use of resources to
the future detriment of all interested parties. Our goals will have been
fulfilled if scholars and those who have the responsibility for officially
representing various parties find this document helpful in identifying some
of the allocation and regulation issues and how they might be addressed.
We wish them well in their difficult tasks.
Key Concepts
The development of the international law of rivers in its simplest form
followed a somewhat predictably human pattern. Typically State A, the
upstream riparian, took an "I am entitled to it all" position, or, in legal
terms, the position of absolute territorial sovereignty. State B, the lower
riparian, commonly responded by also taking an "I am entitled to it all"
position, or one of absolute territorial integrity. See Figure 1. International
and interstate practice responded to the "I am entitled to it all" claims
with a "no, you must share the waters" or the doctrine of equitable
apportionment or equitable
utilization. "No one party can unilaterally
56
determine its share.",
In regard to transboundary aquifers (Figure 2), we have very little
international practice. But by analogy with the international and interstate
law of rivers, we can say:
1. no one party is entitled to all of the waters of a transboundary
aquifer;
2. the use of the waters of the aquifer must be shared by those parties
which overlie it; and
3. no one party may unilaterally determine its share.
In regard to those transboundary aquifers which are tributary to or
interrelated with an international stream (Figure 3), we can say that:
1. both State A and State B must share the use of the waters of the
aquifer equitably, and
2. neither state may use the aquifer so as to impair deliveries of surface
waters pursuant to existing agreements governing surface waters.
56. Griffin, The Use of Waters of International Drainage Basins Under Customary International

Law, 53 AM. J. INT'L. L. 50 (1959); THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS, (Garretson,
Hayton & Olmstead eds. 1967); L. TECLAFF, THE RIVER BASIN IN HISTORY AND LAW (1967); Utton,
International Streams and Lakes, in 2 WATERS AND

WATER RIGHTS

402 (Clark ed. 1967).
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Building on these fundamental premises, the Ixtapa Draft Agreement
has several key concepts, including:
1. decision by mutual agreement,
2. critical area protection (or case by case decision making), and
3. administration by the respective parties themselves.
The allocation and regulation of the use of transboundary groundwaters
should be by the mutual agreement of the parties. Conversely, no one
party may unilaterally determine its share of the uses of the groundwaters
of a transboundary aquifer.
The critical zone concept is a common practice under which the responsible agency would not assert jurisdiction along the entire length of
a common frontier, but would rather only proceed selectively in areas
which were determined to be "critical areas" because of, for example,
the threat of severe overdraft or aquifer contamination. In these critical
areas the administering agency could, for example, regulate withdrawals
by controlling the size, number, or placement of wells.
The actual administration of water rights and regulating measures is
left to the respective Parties so as to minimize intrusions into the territorial
sovereignty of the parties.

OUTLINE OF IXTAPA DRAFT
This draft generally follows a simple structure.
I. First, the designated joint agency is called on to carry out a continued research program to identify and understand transboundary
aquifers.
II. Using the developed information, the agency may declare "Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Areas."
III. Groundwater uses in declared conservation areas are subject to a
spectrum of protective measures, ranging from interim and per-
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manent measures regulating withdrawals to equitable apportionment.
IV. Special attention is given to "mining" and using groundwater as
a "drought reserve."
V. Special provision is made for protecting the quality of transboundary groundwater.
DRAFT AGREEMENT
RELATING TO THE USE OF
TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATERS
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,

and

Motivated by the spirit of cordiality and cooperation which
governs the relations between them;
Desirous of expanding the scope of their concerted actions
with respect to the problems confronting their peoples along
their common frontier;
Recognizing the critical importance of their shared water
resources and the need to enhance the use and conservation of
the said resources on a long-term basis;
Noting especially the present unsatisfactory state of protection and control of their shared groundwaters, as well as the
prospect of crisis conditions in some areas because of increasing demands upon, and the decreasing quality of, those groundwaters;
Seeking to provide for the sharing and protection of those
groundwaters on an equitable basis and, to that end, for the
creation and maintenance of an adequate data base;
Seeking to promote the rational use of these groundwaters
and an equitable sharing of the available groundwaters in the
border region;
Recognizing that the efficient use of their shared water resources is essential to the interests of both Parties;
Resolving to protect the quality of the groundwaters for
present and future generations;
Wishing to resolve amicably any differences that may arise
in connection with the use, protection or control of the said
groundwaters and, for that purpose, to strengthen their joint
agency; and
Concluding that the best means to achieve the rational management of their shared water resources and the protection of
the underground environment is to adopt, in principle, an in-
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tegrated approach including, ,where appropriate, the conjunctive use of surfacewater and groundwater;
Have agreed as follows:
COMMENT:
I. This document presumes a common interest of all Parties in coming
to an agreement concerning groundwater, but by no means assumes all
interests in relation to the resource are in common. There mmay ibe differences between or among Parties in the extent of concern about the
management of the resource. There may be differences in the priority of
goals such as economic development and the protection of environmental
quality. Further, there may be differences in the financial and other resources which the Parties may bring to bear in participating in the management of this joint resource. While all Parties to the agreement are
equal in a legal sense, it is recognized that some suggested substantive
provisions may appear more advantageous to some Parties depending
upon their particular attributes and their extent of control over the resource. While we may cite specific examples of where suggested provisions may be favorable to certain interests under particular circumstances,
we leave it to diplomatic negotiations to identify specific interests in an
actual application.
II. This preamble purports to set forth, in addition to iterations of
friendship and good will, the Parties' salient policy principles with regard
to groundwaters of common concern, including implied acknowledgement of the interrelationships between water resources on the surface and
those underground.
III. Both water quality and water supply, interdependent in any event,
receive express attention; use of the phrase "underground environment"
imports a concern for the water body (aquifer) as well as the water stored
in, and flowing through, it.
IV. The means proposed for actually accomplishing the Parties' policy
objectives-duties of the Parties, augmentation of the functions of their
commission (presumably heretofore restricted, or largely so, to surface
waters), and the special powers under specified conditions-are left to
the operative provisions of the agreement.
V. General terms are employed at the outset (e.g., "shared water
resources" and "on an equitable basis"), leaving to the substantive articles, including definitions, the establishment of the agreement's words
and phrases of art.
ARTICLE I-DEFINITIONS
As used in this Agreement:
I. "Aquifer" means waterbearing geologic formation.
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Kilometers
II. "Border Area" means that area within __
from the mutual boundary.
III. "Drought" means a condition of abnormal water scarcity in a specific area resulting from natural factors.
IV. "Groundwater" means all water beneath the surface of
the ground.
V. "Impairment" means any change in a water resource
under the jurisdiction of the Commission which significantly reduces or restricts the potential for the use of
that water resource.
VI. "Interrelated Surface Water" means those surface waters
in the territory of either Party the quantity or quality of
which is affected by the outflows from or inflows to
transboundary ground waters.
VII. "Mining" means the withdrawal of waters from an aquifer over a period of time in amounts greater than the
recharge to the aquifer over the same period of time.
VIII. "Pollutant" means any waterbome substance or property
which in concentration or combination may be toxic or
harmful to public use, to human, animal, or plant life.
IX. "Pollution" means the introduction of pollutants into
transboundary groundwaters that results in an impairment of human, plant, animal or public use.
X. "Recharge" means the addition of water to an aquifer
by infiltration of precipitation through the soil, infiltration from surface streams, lakes or reservoirs, flow of
groundwater from another aquifer, or pumpage of water
into the aquifer through wells.
XI. "State(s)" means the Parties to this treaty.
XII. "Sustained Yield" means the maximum quantity of water
permitted to be withdrawn from an aquifer intersected
by a common boundary, calculated to provide that quantity either indefinitely or for a period of years.
XIII. "The Commission" means the joint agency designated
in Article 3 of this Agreement.
XIV. "Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area" means
the areas declared by the Commission to be a Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area pursuant to
Article 5.
XV. "Transboundary Groundwaters" means waters in aquifers intersected by a common boundary.
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COMMENT ON ARTICLE I
I. These definitions are applicable in a variety of geographic settings.
However, because conditions do vary greatly from one location to another,
local factors including not only physical but also political, economic, and
cultural conditions need to be considered. Some definitions merit specific
comment.
II. The definition of "aquifer" is meant to cover any. underground
water source. An alternative definition would be "a waterbearing geologic
formation that yields signficant quantities of water to wells or springs."
This alternative definition includes two characteristics of most aquifers:
(1) ability to hold significant quantities of water; and (2) permeability
sufficient to transmit that water. The alternative definition is adequate for
aquifers where water is extracted at the present time or that have a natural
discharge. The broader definition in the Article covers untapped aquifers
that might be in danger or pose a threat to critical aquifers as a result of
a variety of human activities such as mining for other resources.
III. The definition of drought is interpretive and most applicable where
the climate of the geographical area results in great deviations from the
average annual quantity on an annual basis. In such situations, numerical
standards for the point at which drought occurs may be difficult to establish. Some members of the Ixtapa Working Group, however, supported
a more objective standard. One member suggested that "we must come
up with a period of time and a measurable degree of diminution by which
to specify the physical conditions that trigger so vast an exercise of
governmental power" [as described in Article 8]. A suggested alternative
definition of drought is:
a period of time exceeding two years where a combination of natural
factors results in the diminution by 30% or more of the average
annual quantity of water available for use in a given water basin.
This alternative definition looks not to the amount of water received in
a geographical area, but to the water available for use. Thus, drought
conditions become a direct function of runoff waters that are stored. The
volume of water received in a watershed can vary from the volume of
water available for use by several hundred percent, depending on many
natural and manmade conditions.
IV. Pollutant, pollution, and impairment have been defined to complement Article X on water quality. Issues concerning pollution and impairment will be controlled by the standards determined under the provisions
of Article X. The definition of pollutant depends on a determination of
what concentrations or combinations of substances or properties are toxic
or harmful to life and other uses. For example, the parties must agree on
what concentration of soluble mineral content is harmful in saline water.
The numerically specified threshold varies in the United States from 500
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parts per million (ppm) soluble mineral content for drinking water to 1000
ppm for other uses.
The definition of pollutant is written broadly to include substances or
properties or their combinations which affect color, taste or odor of
groundwater and therefore possible uses of it. Also the word "property"
could include temperature change which could be harmful to some uses.
V. "Transboundary Groundwaters" is surely the most important definition, since protection of those waters is the ultimate goal of this agreement. Although all of the participants appreciated the need for a system
wide approach to groundwater management, most felt that any definition
beyond this would be so broad as to require system wide management
by the Commission, an unrealistic expansion of powers in most circumstances.
Where the Parties have previously agreed to permit an existing Commission to manage water resources, an alternative definition could be
used:
"Transboundary Groundwaters" means waters that are below the
surface that discharge into or are fed by international surface boundary waters or are intersected by the common frontier, whether such
underground waters flow in channels, percolate, are in direct contact
with ground or subsoil or are ecologically isolated.
This definition identifies the kind of groundwater that is of concern in
this treaty, and is broad enough to include nearly all kinds of groundwater.
The definition also ensures that groundwaters that begin or end in international surface waters are not excluded. With regard to surface waters
the Great Lakes Agreement of 1978, Article (h), 57 extends to waters
flowing into or out of boundary waters, and the Helsinki Rules of 1966,
Article 1,8 make groundwaters that flow into surface waters of an international basin part of the waters of that basin. A broad definition of the
groundwaters of concern might avoid controversies as to the areal extension of the Commission's jurisdiction, thereby avoiding a situation where
an international basin is subject to conflicting and possibly mutually
defeating administrative systems. Political reality, however, would surely
indicate that this definition is likely to be too broad to be acceptable. The
limits placed by the 1944 Treaty between the United States and Mexico
on the jurisdiction of the International Boundary and Water Commission
to the "limitrophe" 59 sections of surface flows reflect the kind of resistance
that could be expected to an expansive definition and thereby grant of
jurisdiction to an international commission.
57. Agreement Between the United States and Canada on Great Lakes Water Quality, 30 U.S.T.
1383, T.I.A.S. No. 9257 (1978).
58. Helsinki Rules on the Uses of International Rivers, International Law Assn., Report of the
52nd Conference held at Helsinki, Aug. 17-20, 1966 (1967).
59. Treaty on Utilization of Waters, Feb. 3-Nov. 14, 1944, United States-Mexico, art. II, 59
Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994.
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ARTICLE I--GENERAL PURPOSES
The Parties recognize their common interest and responsibility to ensure the amicable, prudent and equitable use of
groundwaters divided by their common boundary for the wellbeing of their citizens in the border region. The Parties further
recognize the critical importance of water to the economic
development, productivity, and progress of their citizens.
Accordingly, the Parties have entered into this Agreement
to ensure the optimum use of transboundary groundwaters on
the basis of equitable sharing, and to protect the quality of the
underground environment. It is also the purpose of the Parties
to develop and share adequate and reliable information concerning transboundary groundwaters in order to use and protect
these waters in a prudent, secure, and informed manner.
COMMENT ON ARTICLE II
The Statement of General Purposes focuses on the reasons why governments negotiate with each other as to the use of shared resources, in
particular, ground waters. It is contemplated that this type of agreement
is the beginning of an ongoing process to manage the resource and provide
that degree of certainty necessary to make prudent decisions as to the use
of the resource. One vital component of any such effort is a strong research
effort to learn about the characteristics of underground waters. As one
Working Group commentator stated:
Hydrologically we operate largely in a sphere of ignorance, not
because we lack understanding of the laws of nature as they relate
to groundwater flow and quality, but because we lack the practical
means to assess the extent of the resource ...

(we) are not able to

map fresh groundwater supplies in the same way as we quantify
surface waters .

.

. [we] have to learn to operate within the range

of uncertainties which exist of a given data base.
The purpose of this prototype agreement, then, is to provide a model
for governments. This agreement seeks to ensure that the present and
future uses of shared groundwaters will represent an equitable sharing of
the use of the resource throughout the life of the resource.
ARTICLE Ill-DESIGNATION OF THE COMMISSION
The

__

Commission is designated as the joint agency

to implement the responsibilities and functions provided for
by this agreement.
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COMMENT ON ARTICLE III

Article III assumes the existence of a commission such as the International Boundary and Water Commission in the case of Mexico and the
United States. Many governments already have administrative bodies with
varying degrees of authority over transboundary water resources. Separate
agencies for groundwater only would complicate resource management
where these agencies already exist, in view of the need for conjunctive
management of surface and groundwaters. If no joint agency exists, the
Working Group assumed that one would be formed.
ARTICLE IV-IDENTIFICATION AND INVESTIGATION OF
TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATERS
I. The Commission, in addition to other duties and obligations, which may have been or may be assigned to it by
the Parties, shall identify, investigate, and verify transboundary groundwaters, and the underground environment. It shall carry out directly or by means of national
or other joint agencies or bodies, public or private, continuing research programs which shall include but will not
necessarily be limited to:
A. a comprehensive inventory of all transboundary
groundwater supplies considering quantity, quality,
aquifer geometry, recharge rates, interaction with surface waters, and other pertinent hydrologic factors;
B. identification of gaps and imbalances in presently
available data, and the preparation of research programs to remedy these deficiencies;
C. a comprehensive examination of present and possible
future uses for said groundwaters, taking into account
demographic projections and economic development
potential;
D. a study of the quantities, qualities, present and possible future uses of other surface and groundwaters,
actually and potentially available for use in the Border
Area;
E. detailed studies of the potential for and consequences
of drought, extended drought, and pollution in the
areas served by transboundary groundwater.
II. The Commission, utilizing its technical staff and the technical staffs of the Parties, is charged with the creation and
maintenance of comprehensive, coordinated joint data files
pertaining to transboundary groundwaters, in the lan-
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guages of the participating Parties. The files should be
continuously updated.
III. The Parties undertake to facilitate the acquisition of information and data by the Commission on a timely basis
in accordance with the Commission's requirements.
IV. The Commission will collate, analyze, and disseminate
the information and data resulting from inventories, examinations and studies.
COMMENT ON ARTICLE IV
A broad research charge is given to the Commission in this article.
The Commission must assess the resource's quantity, quality, hydrological
characteristics and present and future uses, given contemporary knowledge. There was a consensus of the Ixtapa Working Group that the authority of any Commission is rooted in its technical understanding of the
resource. In addition, the Commission must also be impartial in assessing
the characteristics of an aquifer. It must be able to collect and interpret
data from all the Parties to the agreement and do research on its own
initiative to reach an integrated understanding of transboundary groundwater resources.
In this regard the Commission is to identify gaps and imbalances in
data which may exist. For example, one side of the frontier may have
more data regarding withdrawals than the other side, thus creating an
imbalance in information. Also the Commission is charged with establishing and maintaining a data base in the languages of the Parties so as
to provide equality of access to the information.
The Commission must have a technical staff to accomplish the goals
of this Article. Included within the staff's duties is the responsibility for
model research standards and units of measurement that the Commission
will use to study the characteristics of the resource.
ARTICLE V-THE DECLARATION OF TRANSBOUNDARY
GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION AREAS
I. The Commission shall on the basis of testing programs
and studies determine the desirability of declaring any
area within the Border Area containing transboundary
groundwaters to be a "Transboundary Groundwater Conser vation Area." Any determination of such desirability
shall be reported to the respective Governments of the
Parties with a draft of the proposed declaration. If no
Party files an objection with the Commission within 180
days, the Commission shall issue the formal declaration.
Any objection(s) filed shall specify the objectionable sec-
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tion(s) of: (1) the proposed declaration; and/or (2) supporting data.
Within ninety (90) days of receipt of such objections,
the Commission shall report to the respective governments
a "revised determination" and a "revised proposed declaration," to be effective within ninety (90) days, unless
a Party files an objection with the Commission. If no
objection is filed within the said ninety (90) day period,
the formal declaration shall be issued by the Commission.
If objection is filed by a Party within the ninety (90) day
period, the Commission shall refer the matter, together
with the entire record, to the Governments for resolution.
The legal status of the aquifer or aquifers named in the
declaration, and of its waters, shall be that of "Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area," as herein
provided, from the date of publication of the declaration
by the Commission.
In making its determination, the Commission shall consider whether:
A. groundwater withdrawals exceed or are likely to exceed recharge so as to endanger yield or water quality;
B. groundwater withdrawals are likely to diminish the
quantity or quality of interrelated surface waters;
C. prudent management of the groundwater resources including the decision to mine groundwater makes such
designation desirable;
D. the area's use as an important source of drinking water
is likely to be impaired;
E. the aquifer is contaminated or is highly susceptible to
contamination; or
F. recurring or persistent drought conditions necessitate
emergency management of all or some water supplies
in a particular area.
II. For the purposes of this article,
A. water quality may be impaired through chemical point
source pollution as well as non-point source pollution;
B. in reaching any conclusions the Commission may take
into account adverse effects on waters previously allocated by agreements between the Parties including
any deterioration in water quality, quantity, or rate of
flow.
III. The Commission shall, based on continuing studies, review the appropriateness of continuing or modifying ex-
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isting Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Areas,
and the desirability of declaring additional Transboundary
Groundwater Conservation Areas. These determinations
of such desirability shall be made at intervals not to exceed
10 years.
COMMENT ON ARTICLE V
I. The data gathered by the Commission under Article IV may identify
various adverse impacts on groundwaters. Once the Commission makes
this finding, an area can be declared a Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area, thereby triggering the Commission's powers under Article
V of the treaty. This "critical area" approach is not novel. "In the common
pattern, the state engineer is given the power to identify aquifers that are
subject to severe overdraft conditions and to limit or impose controls for
the drilling of new wells."' Examples of the "critical area" approach
would include the Arizona Groundwater Management Code6 and the New
Mexico Groundwater Code.62
II. The Ixtapa Working Group discussed a spectrum of options. These
options clearly reflected the tension between the need to give power to
act to a technical body and the reality of what is possible politically. One
member said, "I still believe that the Commission should be limited to
recommending. Otherwise we are being politically unrealistic." Another
argued that if the agreement attempts too much, nothing will be accepted.
"The urge for utopia flies in the face of the possible." Another said "there
are limits to what sovereign nations will accept. It would be better to
leave these matters to the parties to work out." Yet, another member said
"We are in a pioneering endeavor; if we do not suggest that the technical
body be able to act affectively, who will? The Commission on the spot
with hands on information needs to be able to act. Governments have
too much on their agenda to be able to respond expeditiously."
The variety of options discussed ranged from the polar positions of
giving the Commission the power to declare a Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area, at one extreme, to giving the Commission only
the power to recommend, at the other extreme. The Working Group opted
for a middle position which allows the technical body to declare a Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area, but which makes the declaration subject to the disapproval of the respective governments. This is
aimed at allowing the specialist commission to act effectively, while
allowing the ultimate political decisions to be exercised by the govern60. Muys, Cummings & Burke, supra note 18, at 49.
61. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§45-401 (Supp. 1981-82).
62. NM. STAT. ANN. §75-11-1 (1968).
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ments. The Working Group thus chose a middle ground between effectiveness and legitimate political checks and balances.
The approach allows for declaration by the Commission subject to the
approval of the Parties during a 180-day ratification period. In the absence
of any objections, the Commission has a mandatory duty to issue a
declaration. A review procedure has been added should any objections
be made by a Party.
At least one commentator felt that the Working Group was being overly
sensitive to "political realities" in debating whether the Commission
should have power to declare Transboundary Groundwater Conservation
Areas. It was argued that the Commission in fact would not be separate
from participating governments but rather would be an extension of them.
It was therefore argued that the Commission should be more than merely
a technical advisory board which would lead to inefficiency at best and
disaster at worst. In response to this suggestion the Working Group has
given the Commission certain emergency powers set out in Articles VIII
and XI.
III. The Working Group also discussed another option which provided
the alternative of the Commission being given either the power to declare
or only the power to recommend. It follows:
Alternate Option
A. The Commission (may declare) (may recommend that the respective governments declare) any transboundary groundwater area to
be a "Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area" when in its
judgment:
1. demand has exceeded or is likely to exceed recharge so as to
endanger yield or water quality;
2. groundwater withdrawals are likely to diminish the quantity or
quality of interrelated surface waters;
3. prudent management of the groundwater resources including the
decision to mine groundwater makes such designation desirable;
4. the area is an important source of drinking water;
5. the aquifer is contaminated or is highly susceptible to contamination; or
6. recurring or persistent drought conditions necessitate emergency
management of all or some water supplies in a particular area.
B. For the purposes of this article,
1. the Commission may determine the appropriate yield from an
aquifer through consideration of economic, hydrological, and
hydrogeological criteria selected by the Commission;
2. water quality may be endangered through chemical point source
pollution and non-point source pollution.
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3. in reaching any conclusions the Commission may take into
account adverse effects on waters previously allocated by agreements between the Parties including any deterioration in water
quality, quantity, or rate of flow.
C. The Commission shall, based on continuing studies, review the
appropriateness of existing Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Areas, and the desirability of declaring additional Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Areas. These determinations
of such desirability shall be made at intervals not to exceed __
years.
IV. There is precedent for giving a Commission a broad spectrum of
responsibility and authority. Perhaps the best example is that of the Delaware River Basin Commission which is given broad powers, including
the power of equitable apportionment and power to veto water projects."
It is necessary, however, to add the caveat that this is an interstate agreement which is remarkable even within the context of a federal system.
It could be expected that such an international agreement would be even
more difficult to negotiate.
Section 3.3 of the Delaware River Basin Compact provides that "the
Commission shall have the power from time to time as the need appears,
in accordance with the doctrine of equitable apportionment, to allocate
the waters of the basin to and among the states signatory to this compact
• . . and to impose conditions, obligations and release requirements. . .. "
Section 3.8 provides: "No project having a substantial effect on the
water resources of the basin shall hereafter be undertaken by any person,
corporation or governmental authority unless it shall have been first submitted to and approved by the commission, subject to the provisions of
Sections 3.3 and 3.5. The commission shall approve a project whenever
it finds and determines that such project would not substantially impair
or conflict with the comprehensive plan and may modify and approve as
modified, or may disapprove any such project whenever it finds and
determines that the project would substantially impair or conflict with
such plan. ..."
Section 3.1 provides: "The commission shall develop and effectuate
plans, policies and projects relating to the water resources of the basin.
It shall adopt and promote uniform and coordinated policies for water
conservation, control, use and management in the basin. It shall encourage
the planning, development, and financing of water resources projects
according to such plans and policies."
V. A variety of situations are listed which could result in the declaration
63. Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961).
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of a Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area (TGCA) because of
danger to the resource. The first situation introduces the concept of an
appropriate yield. Where an aquifer is recharged on a continuing basis
by the hydrologic cycle, an appropriate yield would limit the amount of
water to be withdrawn from the aquifer over a period of time. The
discussion in paragraph II emphasizes the nontechnical approach of this
agreement in that the determination of what constitutes an appropriate
sustained yield is left up to the Commission, and is not the result of any
preexisting definition. These options also require the Commission to consider the effects of nonpoint source pollution, such as saline waters and
fertilizer leachates. The Commission is asked to consider effects on interrelated surface waters under existing treaties or compacts.
VI. Paragraph III mandates a review of a TGCA declaration every ten
years. This seeks to accommodate the goal of flexibility, in order to
respond to increased knowledge about the TGCA and its use, with the
need for certainty. Certainty is necessary to provide a time frame by
which people can rely upon the use of the resource for capital investment
decisions. Although many would argue that certainty is the more vital
need, flexibility is also necessary in order to adjust to changing conditions
including economic development and new technology and to take into
account new knowledge of the aquifer. One commentator said, "I have
trouble with apportionment. It is too inflexible. The degree of uncertainty
about future developments is too great." Economists have commented
that the tradeoff between certainty and flexibility may be the heart of the
problem of equitable allocation.
ARTICLE VI-APPORTIONMENT AND INTERIM AND
PERMANENT MEASURES
I. After declaring a "Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area" the Commission shall prepare and administer
with appropriate periodic revisions, a Comprehensive Plan
for the rational development, use, protection, and control
of the waters in the Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area. Pursuant to said plan the Commission may:
A. Equitably apportion the uses of groundwaters and interrelated surface waters consistent with any other apportionment previously made by the Parties in the
Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area between the Parties and/or
B. Prescribe interim measures including, inter alia:
1. limiting the pumping of groundwater within the
Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area to
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specified quantities, or number and capacities of
pumps;
2. establishing criteria for the placement of, and requiring approvals for, new wells, where permitted;
3. retiring existing wells in cases where continued
operation substantially threatens the quality of
groundwaters;
4. establishing pumping fees or charges for groundwater extractions, to be paid to the account of the
respective National Section of the Commission;
5. reserving groundwaters or portions of Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Areas for future
use;
6. other measures as may be deemed appropriate by
the Commission, including the collection and reporting of information and data.
C. Prescribe permanent measures to govern abstraction
of groundwaters within the Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Areas after monitoring the effects
of interim measures for a reasonable time.
II. The Commission shall have the power to approve advances against future years' planned withdrawals under
an equitable apportionment or as a variance to interim or
permanent measures because of demonstrated need.
III. The Commission shall carry on continuing studies to determine the appropriateness of interim measures which
have been prescribed and whether such interim measures
should be continued or modified. Determinations of whether
interim measures should be continued shall be made at
- years.
intervals not to exceed
IV. In making the decisions under this Article the Commission
shall consider the following:
A. The geography of the area, including each Party's
proportion of total surface area overlying the Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area;
B. The hydrology and hydrogeology of the area, including:
1. the proportion of the total volume of the available
water in the Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area which lies within each Party's territory;
2. the contribution of recharge by each Party;
3. other relevant hydrogeologic considerations such
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as aquifer geometry, flow characteristics including
inflow and outflow, groundwater quality and vulnerability to contamination, aquifer transmissability, permeability, recharge areas and rates, and other
data pertinent to apportioning, protecting, and controlling the waters of the Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area; and
4. interaction between the aquifer and any surface
waters.
C. Existing utilization by each Party with particular attention to present and possible future uses for human
consumption, and for sanitation, health services, and
public safety such as for fire control and other municipal uses;
D. The protection of the water quality necessary for each
Party's utilization of the shared resource;
E. Economic implications;
F. Water conservation practices and efficiency in water
use and management;
G. Other considerations deemed to be relevant by the
Commission.
The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in comparison with that of other
relevant factors. In determining what is an equitable share
and/or appropriate interim measure, all relevant factors
are to be considered together with a conclusion reached
on the basis of the whole.
V. An appropriate sustained yield may be determined by the
Commission through consideration of economic, hydrological, and hydrogeological criteria selected by the Commission.
VI. Any determination by the Commission to equitably apportion or prescribe interim or permanent measures shall
be reported to the respective governments of the Parties
with a draft of the proposed action. If no Party files an
objection with the Commission within 180 days the Commission shall proceed with the proposed action.
Any objection(s) filed shall specify the objectionable
sections of: (1) the proposed action; and/or (2) supporting
data.
Within ninety (90) days of receipt of such objections,
the Commission shall report to the respective governments
a "revised proposed action," to be effective within ninety
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(90) days, unless a Party files an objection with the Commission. If no objection is filed within the said ninety (90)
day period, the proposed action shall be put into effect.
If objection is filed by a Party within the ninety (90) day
period, the Commission shall refer the matter, together
with the entire record, to the Governments for resolution.
COMMENT ON ARTICLE VI
I. The Working Group discussed two principal options, each of which
has the same ultimate goals of structuring an ongoing process that leads
to a fair and secure sharing of the use of the resource and the protection
of the underground environment.
In earlier drafts of the prototype agreement, each option was based
strictly upon the doctrine of equitable apportionment. The Ixtapa Working
Group rejected this approach because of the need for a more flexible
range of possible regulatory measures.
One participant said, "I prefer the option with the interim measures.
In general, management through interim measures makes better sense to
me than apportionment." Although another was "uncomfortable with the
interim measures, on the basis of giving too much power to the Commission." He went on to say, "However, if the problem is overdraft,
some interim measures may be necessary."
II. The Commission has been given the authority to equitably apportion
the use of the resource and/or manage it through the listed interim or
permanent measures. Included in the list of interim measures is the power
to reserve groundwaters for future use. The power to reserve groundwaters
for future uses can be used as a variation to equitable apportionment in
that the Commission might want to apportion only some of the groundwaters and set aside a portion as a reserve pending the development of
more information about the aquifer, or changes in technology or patterns
of use, demand, and economic development.
The interim measures provide a degree of flexibility on an aquiferwide basis. This would complement the transfer provisions of Article IX
which allow for flexibility on an individual use basis. The interim measures can be used in a variety of ways: as steps taken in place of equitable
apportionment based upon a management scheme or, once the use of a
resource is apportioned, these measures can be taken to maintain the
allocation of all Parties to the agreement.
Hydrological uncertainty also makes interim measures attractive to
some commentators. Any quantification of an aquifer is at best a partially
informed guess. The same would be true for any quantitative apportionment. Flexibility allows for change as knowledge of an aquifer increases,
or as natural or artificial additives affect the aquifer.
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One participant commented, "I think the process would be more logical
and acceptable if the Commission were required to impose interim measures and monitor them and give them a chance to work before imposing
the step of equitable sharing or any other permanent or semi-permanent
measures."
III. Reevaluation of interim measures serves the same purpose as reevaluation of the TGCA declaration because it gives the certainty necessary for investment and promotes prudent planning and management
while providing opportunity for change with changing conditions. Also,
it was concluded that there should be provision for permanent measures
in lieu of or in addition to apportionment after monitoring the effects of
interim measures for a reasonable time.,
IV. In order to strike a workable middle position between administrative effectiveness and political responsiveness, the Commission is given
the power to take a spectrum of actions ranging from interim measures
to equitable apportionment, but subject to disapproval by the respective
governments within a 180 day period.
V. Equitable apportionment is a common approach to the allocation
of surface water resources between sovereigns and is accomplished through
negotiation or adjudication.'
The end result of any equitable apportionment is a rather inflexible set
allocation, thus leading to the criticism that an equitable apportionment
cannot adequately anticipate changing conditions.6" Interim measures that
can become permanent provide considerable flexibility and to a significant
extent overcome the rigidity of equitable apportionment as the sole alternative. Additional flexibility can be achieved by permitting the transfer
of water as provided in Article IX.
VI. As an alternative to the centralized, regulatory approach to managing an aquifer implied in Article VI, Cummings suggests a decentralized
approach which relies on price mechanisms as a means of controlling
pumping rates. In such a system, a tax is imposed on water use which
is based on the scarcity value of water. The scarcity value of water is
based on each state's share of groundwater stock as well as the impact
of mining on pumping costs. In cases where these latter impacts are
uncertain, scarcity values are revised periodically as additional information becomes available. With appropriately structured measures for
scarcity values, and the imposition of user charges or taxes in these
amounts, water users would have no incentive to extract the resource at
rates in excess of alloted amounts -indeed, disincentives would exist
for more rapid rates of pumping. Cummings further argues that decen64. Management of International Water Resources: Institutional and Legal Aspects, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESA/5144 (1975).
65. Utton, International Water Quality Law, 13 NAT. RES. J. 282, 309 (1973).
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tralized decision-making by individual water users could result in rates
of resource use that are the same as those which might be "imposed" by
limiting pumping by regulation. He goes on to say that such taxes, once
collected, must not be returned to water users in any way proportional
to their water use. The redistribution of tax collections in proportion to
water use would have the effect of reducing the effective tax paid per
acre foot. If tax collections are ultimately returned, all or in part, to water
users, such returns must be in the form of "lump sum" payments which
are in no way related to quantity of water pumped by each water user.'
This pricing or decentralized approach is provided as a possible tool
under I(B)4 by giving the Commission the option of establishing pumping
fees or charges for groundwater. extractions. Cummings adds the caveat
that the pricing or decentralized method
is not a panacea in terms of assuring compliance with terms of any
agreement. Its use presupposes the existence of substantial amounts
of information (which is many times unavailable) concerning revenue
and cost relationships relevant for all water users; further, distributive
and equity considerations are ignored: relatively high cost water users
may be put out of business as a result of the tax. To the (likely)
extent which equity considerations weigh heavily in states' considerations of transboundary agreements concerning groundwater resources, few options may exist to some sort of the regulatory
commission ... "
VI. Most of the criteria set out in this Article to be considered in
determining an apportionment or other measures can be evaluated objectively, reducing subjective determinations from the Commission. It is
important, however, to remember the words of Justice Holmes in New
Jersey v. New York: "[Tlhe effort always is to secure an equitable apportionment without quibbling over formulas." 6 Commentators disagreed on the value of the concept of the proportion of total volume of
available water in the TGCA which underlies a Party's territory because
it would be necessary to determine what water was referred to. For
example, the reference may be to all waters, including those unfit for
use, or to only usable water. Other members of the Working Group
expressed concern with the listing of relevant hydrogeologic considerations because these terms represent contested concepts of the physical
sciences which could be used as labels to achieve a preconceived expectation rather than raw data.
Other considerations might include:
66. Muys, Cummings & Burke, supra note 18, at 64.
67. Id.at 68.
68. 283 U.S. 336, 337 (1931).
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The population dependent on the waters of the aquifer in each border
area;
The comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic and social needs of each basin nation;
The availability of other water resources;
The avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of
the area;
The degree to which the needs of one nation may be satisfied without
causing substantial injury to the other nation;
The protection of the water quality of each nation's uses;
Also of interest are the criteria suggested by U.S. federal law and
Spanish law for the equitable apportionment of surface water. The United
States Supreme Court has said that equitable apportionment
calls for the exercise of an informed judgement on a consideration
of many factors. Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle.
But physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water
in several sections of the river, the character and rate of return flows,
the extent of established uses, the availability of storage water, the
practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas if a limitation
is imposed on the former-these are all relevant factors. They are
merely an illustrative, not an exhaustive, catalogue. They indicate
the nature of the problem of apportionment and the delicate adjustment of interests which must be made.69
Seven principles have been identified that were used in deciding water
disputes under Spanish colonial and Mexican law:7"
1. Title. Without question, a Spanish or Mexican judge would first
ask Parties to the case to produce their titles.
2. Prior Usage. Prior usage was not synonymous with the oldest
usage; a firmly established newer usage would be taken into
consideration as well in a subsequent division of water.
3. Need. If a litigant or group of litigants asked for a new grant of
water or an amount above and beyond that which they had been
using, the judge would inquire about the increased need, a fundamental concept in water allocations. If, for example, population
increase seemed to substantiate the claim of increased need, he
might well have extended additional water rights. At the same
69. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
70. Michael C. Meyer & Susan S. Deeds, Land, Water, and Equity in Spanish Colonial and
Mexican Law: Historical Evidence for the Court in the Case of State of New Mexico vs. R. Lee
Aamodt et al. 69 (Aug. 1979).
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time, he would weigh this decision against the needs of others
who might be using the water or who might have legitimate claim
to it.
Exclusivity and Injury to Third Party. If a group of petitioners
asked for exclusive rights to all of the water from a given source
or as much water as they wanted to take from the source, without
reference to the needs of others, the judge would be hard put to
find many precedents for such exclusivity.
Intent. The judge hearing the case would inquire about intent.
Why did a petitioner or group of petitioners want more water?
How did they intend to use it? Were their goals in harmony with
those of the larger community? Would the grant of water contribute to an expansion of agriculture, would it increase tax revenues for Church or State, would it benefit the poor?
Legal Right. In the water disputes, the establishment of legal right
was important for the contending Parties. All would have a decided advantage over a competitor without it. But the concept of
legal right was not an absolute. Other considerations, such as
need and prior use, could subordinate legal right to a secondary
position in the process of adjudicating water controversies.
Equity and the Common Good. Finally, in the solitude of his
chambers, the judge might well ponder the doctrines of equity
and the common good, the foundations of all Spanish colonial
and Mexican law. He would ask himself what was equitable for
the petitioners, for other individuals, and for the larger community.

VII. The theory of Equitable Participation moves away from notions
of quantification of the volume of a nation's allocation to the protection
of a nation's rights and duties as a participant in the management of a
shared resource. Three basic principles have been set out by the International Law Commission:
1. The waters of an international watercourse system shall be developed and used by the system States on an equitable basis with
a view to attaining optimum utilization of those waters, consistent
with adequate protection and control of the components of the
system.
2. Without its consent, a State may not be denied its equitable participation in the utilization of the waters of an international watercourse system of which it is a system State.
3. An equitable participation includes the right to use water resources
of the system on an equitable basis and the duty to contribute on
an equitable basis to the protection and control of the system as
particular conditions warrant or require.
The emphasis of this approach is that uses should be equitably shared
between nations, and that participation involves both the right to use and
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the complimentary duty to protect the rights of others to use the resource.
To these ends, this option gives the Commission responsibility for the
development and administration of a comprehensive plan to bring about
equitable participation.
An alternate Article VI would be:
ARTICLE VI-EQUITABLE PARTICIPATION
I. The Commission shall prepare, and as approved by the
Parties shall administer with appropriate periodic revisions, a comprehensive plan for the rational development,
use, protection, and control of the Parties' transboundary
waters. The plan shall, inter alia, include provisions:
A. to assess, as between the Parties and at the request of
any Party, the equities in relation to the uses of transboundary waters, of parts thereof, or of a. particular
use as required under the circumstances, and to determine on the basis of such assessment whether a use
or uses are consistent with the Parties' equitable participation in the transboundary waters under this
agreement and other agreements in force;
B. to prescribe standards and measures for the protection
of transboundary groundwaters generally and to modify such standards and measures with respect to any
controlled aquifers to include restrictions or prohibitions with respect to effluent discharges and the dumping, injection, or application of substances deemed by
the Commission likely to result in significant contamination of transboundary groundwaters.
C. to restrict the extraction of, and discharge to, transboundary waters in any Transboundary Groundwater
Conservation Area.
D. to prescribe interim measures with respect to Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area.
II. Transboundary waters shall be developed and used by the
Parties on an equitable basis with a view to attaining
optimum utilization of those waters, consistent with adequate protection and control of the components of the
system.
III. An equitable participation includes the right to use water
resources of the system on an equitable basis and the duty
to contribute on an equitable basis to the protection and
control of the system as particular conditions warrant or
require.
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A. The right of a Party to a particular use of the transboundary water resources depends, when questioned
by another Party, upon objective evaluation of:
1. contribution of water to transboundary waters, in
comparison with that of the other Party (Parties),
2. development and conservation of the transboundary water resources,
3. degree of interference, by such use, with uses or
protection and control measures of the other Party
(Parties),
4. other uses of transboundary water, in comparison
with uses by the other Party (Parties),
5. social and economic need for the particular use,
taking into account available alternative water supplies (in terms of quantity and quality), alternative
modes of transport or alternative energy sources,
and their cost and reliability, as pertinent,
6. efficiency of use of transboundary water resources,
7. pollution of transboundary water resources generally and as a consequence of the particular use,
if any,
8. cooperation with the other Party (Parties) in projects or programs to attain more optimum utilization
and protection and control of transboundary water
resources, and
9. stage of economic development;
B. the total adverse affect, if any, of such use on the
economy and population of other Parties, including
the economic value of and dependence upon existing
uses of the transboundary waters, and the impact upon
the protection and control measures of the Parties;
C. the efficiency of use by the other Party (Parties);
D. availability to the other Party (Parties) of alternative
sources of water supply, energy or means of transport,
and their cost and reliability, as pertinent;
E. cooperation of the other Party (Parties) with the Party
whose use is questioned in projects or programs to
attain optimum utilization and protection and control
of transboundary waters.
One commentator speculated that equitable participation could result
in a stronger Commission since it could command the cooperation of the
Parties. There would be no incentive to use non-participation as a strategy
to obtain concessions. Another commentator argued that theories such as
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equitable apportionment and equitable utilization are inadequate. He urged
the need "to explore and articulate" Equitable Participation as a part of
"the progressive development" of international water law. Equitable Participation imports
a sense of affirmative cooperation, even collaboration, in order to
achieve reasonable and rational use, protection and control -in
short, not just a determination of 'rights' against the others, but a
partnership in development and safety. Such affirmative obligations
and opportunities cannot, it is submitted, be adequately handled with
the Principle Equitable Utilization, based on equality of right, alone.
The right, as it were, to have the other system States co-operate with
you in protection and control measures should be expressed in a
larger fashion, encompassing the entire bundle of rights and obligations associated with system-State status which, after all, implies
co-system State status. 7'
ARTICLE VII-PLANNED DEPLETION
The Commission, after evaluating all relevant considerations, may approve depletion of an aquifer over a calculated
period with the consent of the Parties. After considering the
environmental, economic, social and hydrologic consequences, the Commission may apportion the use of groundwaters and/or prescribe interim or permanent measures in a
way that allows either Party or both Parties to withdraw groundwater at a rate that exceeds the rate of recharge.
After approval of the decision so to deplete by the respective
governments, a groundwater management plan for such depletion shall be drawn up and promulgated by the Commission.
The management plan shall be carried out by the respective
governments, each of which shall make annual reports to the
Commission reflecting the measures taken, the quantities withdrawn from the aquifer or aquifers designated for depletion in
the plan, and any problems encountered in adhering to the
plan.
COMMENT ON ARTICLE VII
I. Flow v. Stock Resources
A useful concept is the distinction between flow and stock resources.
Flow resources are self-replenishing and include those groundwaters which
are being recharged on a continuing basis as part of the hydrologic cycle
71. Hayton, The Law of International Water Resources Systems, in RIVER BASIN DEVELOPMENT,

209 (Zaman ed. 1983).
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of precipitation and evaporation. It is these groundwaters which one would
try to use on a "sustained yield" basis. The concept of what constitutes
a "sustained yield" is dynamic in that much depends upon the extent of
knowledge about a system. What would be an appropriate withdrawal
rate at one specific time might be superfluous two years later. There
are, however, aquifers with small recharge, but with a large amount of
water in underground storage which "for all practical purposes . . . has
been sidetracked from the hydrologic cycle and is no longer in transit.
In human time, at least, it is not self replenishing, but an exhaustible
resource, similar to petroleum and other minerals." 7 2 These nonreplenishing groundwaters are, for all practical purposes, exhaustible "stock
resources." They are not being replenished. Thus, continued extraction
will lead in time to their complete exhaustion. When exhaustion occurs,
or when further mining becomes impractical, the economic activities and
other uses dependent upon that supply must turn to other sources or be
abandoned:
With a stock resource the decisions to be made are whether and
when to use it. A property rights doctrine should recognize that rights
to such resources do not involve a perpetual supply. It should permit
a decision to hold the stock for use at a later time if it is so desired.
In a flow resource the problem is to make the best uses of the
supply which is continuously available though not necessarily, and
in the case of water ordinarily not, at a constant rate ... .73
Thus, the concept of sustained yield is useful for aquifers recharging on
a continuing basis, and the concept of mining is appropriate for "stock
resource" groundwaters which are not being recharged significantly.
H. Management of GroundwaterMining
The Ixtapa Working Group unanimously agreed that the Commission
should be given authority to develop a plan for the use of groundwater
once the Parties agree that the aquifer shall be used in such a way as to
deplete it. If the Parties have left planning and management decisions to
the Commission, the Commission could be given the express power to
prepare a plan without waiting for the Parties to act. It is worth making
special note of the merit of rationally deciding to mine groundwaters in
appropriate circumstances. It has been postulated that a principal purpose
of groundwater laws should be "to provide for an orderly development
of groundwater supplies, in the interest of the best utilization of this
72. Bagley, Water Rights Law and Public Policies Relating to Ground Water "Mining" in the
Southwestern States, 4 J. L. & ECON. 144, 147 (1961).
73. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
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natural resource." 74 Therefore, these laws ordinarily do not sanction diversions that would adversely affect the "complete development of the
safe yield found to exist in the area,"" in order to preserve the water
supply in perpetuity. This is an admirable statement when related to
"flow" groundwaters, but what of "stock" groundwaters?
The decision in "stock" groundwaters is "whether and when to use" 76
them, because they are not a replenishing, perpetual supply. In order not
to oversimplify, it must be pointed out that flow resources groundwater
also can be mined when withdrawals exceed recharge, and this fact is
what actually gives rise to the concept of sustained yield.
There may be situations where it is advisable to "mine" water in basins
where there is significant but inadequate recharge to meet water needs.
Such decisions should be made consciously, with the knowledge of the
economic consequences and the fact that future generations' options will
be limited.
Corker argues that sustained yield should not be a sacred principle.
The decision to mine can be a rational alternative, but that "'safe yield,"'
if a proper term can be discovered or if the old term can be acceptably
defined, should be the basis of operation of every groundwater resource, "77 until the decision to mine is made consciously and with full
knowledge of its implications.
Development has to be made in an orderly, rational manner, based
upon thorough investigation and consideration. This is particularly so
where the groundwater resource is divided by an international boundary,
in view of the fact that damage done to the resource and to the other
country cannot easily be corrected by natural recharge. At least these
" 'stock' groundwaters once removed, are for all practical purposes gone
forever. "78
The New Mexico Supreme Court has recognized the validity of mining
groundwaters for reasoned policy goals and at the same time recognized
the need for careful management of such mining.
[T]he administration for a non-rechargeable basin, if the waters
therein are to be applied to a beneficial use, requires giving to the
stock or supply of water a time dimension, or, to state it otherwise,
requires the fixing of a rate of withdrawal which will result in a
determination of the economic life of the basin at a selected time.
74.
Dept.
75.
76.
77.
1971).
78.

W.

HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST 178 (U.S.

of Agric. Misc. Pub. No. 418, 1942).
Id.
Bagley, supra note 72, at 153.
C. CORKER, GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT

AND ADMINISTRATION

174 (Nat'l Water Comm'n

Fischer, Management of Interstate Groundwater, 7 NAT. RESOURCES L. 521, 524 (1974).
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The very nature of the finite stock of water in a non-rechargeable
basin compels a modification of the traditional concept. . . .Each
appropriator, subsequent to the initial appropriation, reduces in amount,
and in time of use, the supply of water available to all prior appropriators, with the consequent decline of the water table, higher pumping costs, and lower yield."
III. Economic Complexity
In Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Areas, the "time
dimension" ' is an essential aspect of the water right."s Particularly in
closed or nontributary areas, the capability to plan depletion over a calculated period is essential. Often the hydrologic and economic considerations are quite complicated; for example, the State Engineer of New
Mexico suggests that if it were determined to set
a fixed "life" for the basin and then apportion the water by fixing
the annual rates for each nation, deferral of development would be
discouraged and there would be a race to achieve the allowed rate
of withdrawal at the earliest time to maximize the quantity that could
be taken within the "life" of the basin. On the other hand, if there
is no limitation on the annual rate, that nation which takes its allocated
quantum at a slower rate will have greater pumping lifts and possibly
a worse quality of water; this could be mitigated by imposing a
reasonable limitation on the annual rate of withdrawal as well as
specifying the quantum allocated to each nation. In most situations
it probably would be useful also to require some areal distribution
of withdrawals to insure that one country does not damage the other
(and perhaps itself) by concentrating its withdrawals along the international boundary. 2
The economic considerations can be even more complex in the case
of transboundary aquifers in which the states sharing the aquifer are at
different stages of economic development.

One commentator suggests that
the state with the higher development level will most likely be pumping water at faster rates than the neighboring state, giving rise to
that state's fear of losing part of its resource endowment-the specter
of "use it or lose it" may also be relevant from states' points of
view. 8
79. Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 77 N.M. 239, 243-44, 421 P.2d 771, 775 (1966).
80. Bagley, supra note 72, at 154-55.
81. See Fundingsland v. Colorado Groundwater Comm'n, 171 Colo. 487, 468 P.2d 835 (1970)
(the court approved a rate of depletion based on a 25-year period).
82. Letter from S.E. Reynolds, State Engineer. Santa Fe, N.M., to Albert Utton (Aug. 29, 1977).
See Bagley, supra note 72, at 159.
83. Muys, Cummings & Burke, supra note 18, at 59.
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The problem can be illustrated by the following:
[S]uppose that on State A's side, substantial irrigation as well as
municipal/industrial activity takes place,. . . Suppose also that State
B has little in the way of economic activity in its area overlying the
aquifer;...
Now suppose that States A and B enter into an agreement compact-whereby each state is entitled to half of the recoverable
stock plus half of annual recharge. While shares of the resource
apportioned to each state are equal and might thereby seem equitable,
it is highly unlikely that the end result would be so viewed. This
follows from the fact that one can expect that State A will rapidly
exhaust its share, while State B will develop and use (or attempt to
use) its share in future years. Of course, as State A exhausts its
"share" of the stock, State B's access to the resource is affected:
recoverable stock may be affected; more importantly, water tables
fall thereby increasing lifts and pumping costs. Thus, the economic
"quality" of State A's share of the aquifer is quite high because
pumping costs are relatively low; but the economic quality of State
B's share is much lower because pumping costs will be higher.
The question becomes how to handle these problems and the same
commentator suggests two possible approaches. One would be joint mining of the aquifer, but this could have the problem that
(i) State B must accelerate its development so as to match its
annual beneficial use of mined water (in quantitative, physical terms)
to that of State A, a "solution" that State B might find highly objectionable; (ii) or State A must reduce its rate of mining to that
required for State B's level of development, a "solution" that State
A would surely find objectionable given the depressive effect implied
for its current level of economic activity."
Another solution would be to have State A compensate State B for the
additional pumping and other costs incurred by State A's earlier use of
the groundwater stock. Cummings suggests that
State A would compensate State B for all external costs. While this
solution is simply stated, its application will undoubtedly be much
less simple. Higher pumping costs to State B, one of the bases for
compensation, must be related to that proportion of total mining by
State A that gives rise to higher costs to State B. Such calculations
may be a source of serious controversy, particularly in (usual) instances where the structure of the shared aquifer varies across the
transboundary area. 5
84. Id. at 63.
85. Id.
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Yet a third possibility would be for State B to transfer a portion of its
present allocated uses to State A pursuant to Article IX for a fixed term
at a negotiated price.
IV. Some Physical Considerations
When an aquifer is being mined, a common problem is degradation
of water quality due to the intrusion of unusable water. This problem is
especially significant where the aquifer is a practically closed system,
stock resource, since these aquifers generally contain greater concentrations of dissolved solids. This consequence represents a fundamental
limitation on how much can be withdrawn from an aquifer.86
It should be noted that when a flow resource is studied for possible
depletion, a lowering of the water table can result in a savings of water
since less is lost through evaporation. This might also result in undesired
environmental and economic changes when wetlands disappear.
V A Final Caveat
In allowing the mining of groundwater stocks, annual water withdrawals are, by definition, at levels which are not sustainable over an indefinite
period of time. Groundwater mining allows an expansion in economic
activity in the area and the attending in-migration of people and an expansion of private and social infrastructure (roads, hospitals, utility facilities, etc.). Once these economic structures are in place -- communities
and institutions exist-the Commission must anticipate the problems of
dismantling these structures when the inevitable time comes at which
levels of water use must decline. Too often, the falling water tables which
must attend the sustained mining of an aquifer give rise to strong political
pressures for some means of "rescuing" the water short area; see, for
example, the controversy surrounding the Central Arizona Project in the
United States.87 The essence of the "rescue operation" problem is described as follows:
Labor and Capital in irrigation areas may be immobile over substantial periods of time once the areas have been developed. Land
improvement investments are sunk and capital equipment ... may
have only low salvage values. Agricultural labor may not have the
skills required to make moving attractive .... Making new (water)
supplies available to such regions may be termed a 'rescue operation. 88
8.

For-example

see Charbeneatu,roundwaterResources of the Texas Rio Grande Basin, 22

NAT. RES. J. 957, 969 (1982).
87. M.M. KELSO, WILLIAM E. MARTIN & LAWRENCE E. MACK, WATER SUPPLIES ARE ECONOMIC
GROWTH IN AN ARID ENVIRONMENT, AN ARIZONA CASE STUDY (1973). See also R.G. Cummings,

Interbasin Water Transfers, A Case Study in Mexico (1974) (Chapter 1, section 3).
88. CHARLES W. HOWE & K. WILLIAM EASTER, INTERBASN TRANSFERS OF WATER 28 (1971).
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ARTICLE VIII-PLANNING AND MEASURING FOR
DROUGHT CONDITIONS
I. Recognizing that drought conditions occur from time to
time, the Commission shall within - year(s) develop a Drought Management Plan for the administration and allocation of shared water resources, including
transboundary groundwaters, during periods of drought.
II. This Plan may authorize the use of certain groundwaters
as a "drought reserve," and, therefore, the conjunctive
management of ground and surface water supplies.
III. This Plan shall be submitted to the Governments.
IV. After acceptance of the Plan, the Commission shall be
empowered to take action applicable to any part or all
of a Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area.
Consistent with the Plan, the authority of the Commission shall include but shall not be limited to the declaration of "drought alerts," and in connection therewith
the imposition of measures for the emergency management of groundwater supplies conjunctively with surface
water supplies.
V. The conservation and emergency management measures
decided upon from time to time by the Commission
under paragraph IV of this Article shall remain in effect
and shall be implemented and observed by the Parties
until modified or terminated by the Commission. Provided that all such measures shall cease to be binding
upon the termination of the "drought alert" or "drought
emergency" by the Commission and provided that the
Governments, by agreement, may at any time impose
extraordinary measures not authorized under the said
Plan.
VI. Enforcement in the territory of each of the Parties of
the actions and measures taken under this Article shall
be the responsibility of the respective Governments.
VII. The Drought Management Plan may include structural
or nonstructural measures; the mining of groundwater
at variance with any groundwater management plan as
provided by Article VII; apportionment; and/or other
interim or permanent measures.
VIII. The Commission in prescribing measures during a declared "drought emergency" may reduce or increase the
total allowable withdrawal from Transboundary Groundwater Conservation areas, but the Commission shall
maintain to the extent practicable the equitable sharing
of benefits and burdens on both sides of the border.
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COMMENT ON ARTICLE VIII

I. There are three essential aspects to the Commission's function concerning drought: The Commission must have the ability to anticipate it,
research the consequences of drought, and develop a plan for the best
measures to alleviate its harsh consequences. This Article is written so
as to allow for either reducing or increasing withdrawals in the event of
drought. The plan must be approved by the respective governments.
II. Conjunctive management of the resource treats both surface and
groundwaters as one system, using groundwater when surface flows are
reduced and then using aquifers for storage when surface flows increase.
Aquifers often are not immediately affected by droughts as are surface
flows, and may provide excellent storage to be used to make up for
reduced surface flows. For this reason, increased withdrawals may be
desirable in case of drought. In other situations, prudent management
could call for reduced withdrawals. For example, the Commission might
reduce withdrawals in the event of a prolonged drought which would, in
judgment of the Commission, significantly affect recharge.
As an example, one might cite the Delaware River Basin Compact,
Art. 3.3(a) and Art. 10.4 (Emergency). Also, Teclaff in Abstraction and
Use of Water, gives some examples of reduction in use of water during
time of drought.89
III. The response to drought may be phased according to the length
of the drought.
It should be noted that the Working Group specifically concluded that
emergency plans should include non-structural measures including, but
not limited to, insurance, and disaster relief to mitigate the consequences
of drought.
IV. Paragraph IV of this article contemplates an equitable sharing of
the burdens or hardship associated with drought. It was suggested that
any increase or reduction in withdrawals shall be borne by each Party in
proportion to the contemporary allowed withdrawal. The precise language
suggested was "Each state's withdrawal otherwise allowable under an
equitable apportionment and/or prescribed interim or permanent measures
accordingly shall be increased or reduced proportionally." This was bothersome, however, to some commentators because the mandatory proportional sharing of the burden was seen as unnecessary and restrictive.
It was pointed out that a Party might wish to give up its share for future
gains. It was generally agreed that the Commission should determine the
allocation of burden without relying on a rigid proportional formula.
It is interesting to note that the United States Supreme Court in Arizona
v. California, rejected the special master's recommendation that there
should be a "pro rata sharing of water shortages." The Court said that
89.
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although the pro rata approach "seems equitable on its face. . . we should
not bind the Secretary to this formula."
The Court went on to give the Secretary flexibility to "devise reasonable
methods of his own" and concluded "the Secretary may or may not
conclude that a pro rata division is the best solution."'
ARTICLE IX-TRANSFERS OF TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATERS
Nothing in this agreement shall be so construed as to prevent
either short-term or long-term transfers of waters to the other
side of the common border under terms and conditions agreed
to by the Commission.
In approving any transfer, the Commission must be assured
that the transfer is consistent with established programs to
protect the quantity and quality of the groundwaters in a Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area.
COMMENT ON ARTICLE IX
The Comments to Article V, supra, point out that any apportionment
of a water resource is subject to the criticism of inflexibility. The concept
of transboundary transfers is rather novel for international water resources
and remedies the inflexibility problem to a substantial extent. The transfers
would be for fixed terms and subject to approval by the Commission.
One commentator has suggested that transfers could result in problems
due to the financial inequality of the Parties, which, if unchecked, could
undermine the benefits derived from an agreement. On the other hand,
transfers can be an effective method for nations that have not fully developed their allocation of the resource to achieve an immediate benefit
without forfeiting any rights to the future use of the resource. Any contemplated transfer must be approved by the Commission.
Another alternative discussed, but not adopted, would have made the
Commission a water broker. Under this suggestion, where an aquifer is
to be apportioned a certain percentage that could be used by any Party
on a temporary basis would be allocated to the Commission. In this
alternative, the Commission would be acting as a water broker and would
have control over these uses to insure that an undesired increase in the
total use of the resource did not result.
ARTICLE X-WATER QUALITY
Option 1
I. The Parties undertake cooperatively to preserve and to
improve, insofar as practicable, the quality of trans90. 373 U.S. 546, 553 (1963).
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boundary groundwaters in conjunction with their individual and joint programs for surface water quality control,
generally, and to avoid appreciable harm to the territory
of either Party.
II. The Commission shall biennially conduct a review of
the measures undertaken within each Party's territory
and shall issue a report containing its assessment of the
adequacy and effectiveness of programs of use, protection, and control of the Parties' shared groundwaters
with particular attention to any declared Transboundary
Groundwater Conservation Area.
Option 2
I. The Parties shall monitor pollution of transboundary
groundwaters and after classifying them according to
use:
A. identify toxic and hazardous pollutants;
B. maintain a continuing record of such substances from
origin to disposal;
C. monitor the storage of toxic wastes;
D. provide the Commission with an inventory of dumpsites, abandoned as well as active, that have the
potential for causing transboundary groundwater
pollution.
II. The actual administration of water quality standards and
regulations within the territory of each Party shall be
the responsibility of each Party respectively or its political subdivisions, as appropriate. In addition, the
Commission shall biennially conduct a review of the
measures undertaken within each Party's territory and
shall issue a report containing its critique of the adequacy
and effectiveness of programs of use, protection and
control of the Parties' shared groundwaters with particular attention to any declared Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Areas. To that end each Party shall
furnish the Commission through its National Section the
relevant data and information on which the Commission
must base its report in accordance with the reporting
scheme provided by the Commission.
Option 3
I. The Commission shall formulate a Water Quality Pro-
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II.

III.

IV.

V.

tection Plan to prevent and eliminate degradation of
transboundary groundwater quality.
A. The plan shall provide for the establishment of a
sufficient number of test wells and other measures
for monitoring and inspection for water purity.
B. The plan shall provide for contingency cleaning
measures and financial responsibility for clean up.
For that purpose the Commission shall classify transboundary groundwaters according to use and promulgate
water quality standards and regulations. These standards
and regulations shall, inter alia
A. identify toxic and hazardous pollutants;
B. require a continuing record of such substances from
origin to disposal;
C. establish approved routing plans for the transportation of toxic and hazardous pollutants;
D. establish criteria for the safe storage of wastes;
E. provide for the inventorying of dumpsites, abandoned as well as active, that have the potential for
causing transboundary pollution.
F. provide for the establishment of protective zones in
which land use may be regulated, if necessary.
The actual administration and enforcement of water quality
standards and regulations within the territory of each
Party shall be the responsibility of each Party respectively or its political subdivisions as appropriate. In addition, the Commission shall biennially conduct a review
of the measures undertaken within each Party's territory
and shall issue a report containing its assessment of the
adequacy and effectiveness of programs of use, protection, and control of the Parties' shared groundwaters
with particular attention to any declared Transboundary
Groundwater Conservation Areas.
In authorizing any discharge into transboundary groundwaters, or recharge areas, the Parties shall follow and
enforce the standards, criteria, regulations and prohibitions established by the Commission.
Each of the Parties covenants and agrees to prohibit and
control pollution in Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Areas according to the Water Quality Protection Plan, standards, and regulations promulgated by the
Commission, and to cooperate faithfully in the control
of future pollution and abatement of existing pollution.
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COMMENT ON ARTICLE X
I. Water quality issues were of great concern to the Ixtapa Working
Group, and there was great diversity of opinion as to what was the best
approach. Therefore three different options are presented which range
from what some called a "mere exhortation" to what others called "cradle
to the grave regulation."
The quantity of groundwater available for use is limited by the quality
of the resource. Groundwater is particularly susceptible to contamination,
and, unlike surface water, once contaminated it is practically impossible
to rehabilitate an aquifer at the present time. Some members of the
Working Group felt that water quality might best be dealt with by a
separate agreement rather than combining it with allocation issues in this
document. Others felt that it was imperative that preservation of water
quality be an express goal because if it were not mentioned, nothing
would be done by any Party to prevent the deterioration of aquifers.
II. There was considerable difference of opinion within the Working
Group over how extensive the power and jurisdiction of the Commission
should be.
Some members definitely preferred a more general approach in which
the specific powers given to the Commission were limited, and argued
that to attempt to do more was politically unrealistic. There also was
concern over the administrative burden and expense of "cradle to the
grave" regulation. "Too much specificity and administrative responsibility could lead to agency overload and ineffectiveness." In addition,
one commentator said "I prefer the more general option. The other options
deal specifically with water quality and hazardous wastes, and I am not
sure we yet know the best way to regulate groundwater pollution."
Others preferred to detail extensive powers for the Commission. They
argued that "the problems are serious and therefore this draft should not
be timid, but rather should be a model of what should be done, not
necessarily only what can be done." One commentator said "Why are
we bold when it comes to apportioning groundwater and timid in regard
to groundwater quality?" Another who favored greater specificity said
"this is a new area in water treaties; there are few guidelines and precedents. A detailed provision would be useful as a model and as a help to
the Commission."
Many aspects of a water quality issue involve value judgments upon
which Parties may be able only to agree to disagree, including such
fundamental considerations as what constitutes a pollutant, and what is
an acceptable concentration of the pollutant. With this in mind, plus the
spectrum of opinion reflected by the Working Group, a series of options
was developed to allow for gradations in the extent to which Parties could
delegate such issues to a commission.
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Option 1
Here the Parties expressly recognize a duty of each not to cause substantial harm to the others. The Commission acts as a "conscience,"
biennially reviewing the actions of each Party to the extent that the duty
to other Parties is not forsaken. Where Parties cannot agree, except as
to the existence of a mutual duty not to harm, this option would be
appropriate.
Option 2
In addition to the general duty recognized in Option 1, Option 2 creates
a duty on all Parties to monitor pollution and classify all transboundary
groundwaters as to use. Additionally, each Party must identify pollutants
and monitor their use within its territory. With this data available the
Commission can competently assess the availability of an aquifer for
certain uses, and whether it is endangered to the extent that it should be
declared to be a TGCA.
Actual administration is left to the Parties, allowing them to make
decisions based upon their political, social, and economic considerations
that inform a water quality decision. This can minimize the intrusion into
the sovereignties of the Parties.
Option 3
This option gives the Commission the most comprehensive responsibilities to deal with water quality problems. It is not without precedent
to give a Commission broad authority to control pollution in a transboundary situation. The Delaware River Basin Commission has been
given substantially more power than that proposed in Option 3. Of course,
it should be observed that the Delaware River Basin Compact is interstate
and not international, and was negotiated under the umbrella of a federal
system. Further, even within the context of an overriding federal constitution, it has been unusual to grant such extensive powers to a Commission. Negotiating an international agreement could be expected to be even
more difficult.
The Delaware River Basin Compact in Section 5.1 provides that "the
Commission may assume jurisdiction to control future pollution and abate
existing pollution. . . . "" Further, the Commission can "establish standards of treatment of sewage, industrial or other waste. . ." and can adopt

"rules, regulations and standards to control such future pollution and

abate existing pollution. . .

."

In addition, the Commission can issue

orders to cease the "violation of such rules and regulations as it shall
91. Delaware Basin River Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961).
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have adopted. ... " The courts of the signatory
Parties shall have juris92
diction to enforce . . . any such order."
In contrast to this extensive power of the Commission itself to establish

its regulations, the Ixtapa Group left the actual enforcement to the Parties
within their respective territories.
Many of the concepts contained in this option are adapted from interstate compacts and the practice of the European Economic Community
92. Id. at §§ 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 merit quoting in full (emphasis added):
5.2 Policy and Standards. The Commission may assume jurisdiction to controlfuture
pollution and abate existingpollution in the waters of the basin, whenever it determines
after investigation and public hearing upon due notice that the effectuation of the
comprehensive plan so requires. The standard of such control shall be that pollution
by sewage or industrial or other waste originating within a signatory state shall not
injuriously affect waters of the basin as contemplated by the comprehensive plan. The
commission, after such public hearing may classify the waters of the basin and establish
standards of treatment of sewage, industrial or other waste, according to such classes
including allowance for the variable factors of surface and ground waters, such as size
of the stream, flow, movement, location, character, self-purification, and usage of the
waters affected. After such investigation, notice and hearing the commission may adopt
and from time to time amend and repeal rules, regulations and standards to control
such future pollution and abate existing pollution, and to require such treatment of
sewage, industrial or other waste within a time reasonable for the construction of the
necessary works, as may be required to protect the public health or to preserve the
waters of the basin for uses in accordance with the comprehensive plan.
5.3 Cooperative Legislation and Administration. Each of the signatory parties covenants and agrees to prohibitand controlpollution of the watersof the basin according
to the requirements of this compact and to cooperate faithfully in the control of future
pollution in and abatement of existing pollution from the rivers, streams, and waters
in the basin which flow through, under, into or border upon any of such signatory
states, and in order to effect such object, agrees to enact any necessary legislation to
enable each such Party to place and maintain the waters of said basin in a satisfactory
condition, available for safe and satisfactory use as public and industrial water supplies
after reasonable treatment, suitable for recreational usage, capable of maintaining fish
and other aquatic life, free from unsightly or malodorous nuisances due to floating
solids or sludge deposits and adaptable to such other uses as may be provided by the
comprehensive plan.
5.4 Enforcement. The commission may, after investigation and hearing, issue an
order or orders upon any person or public or private corporation, or other entity, to
cease the discharge of sewage, industrialor other waste into watersof the basin which
it determines to be in violation of such rules and regulations as it shall have adopted
for the prevention and abatement of pollution. Any such order or orders may prescribe
the date, including a reasonable time for the construction of any necessary works, on
or before which such discharge shall be wholly or partially discontinued, modified or
treated, or otherwise conformed to the requirements of such rules and regulations.
Such order shall be reviewable in any court of competent jurisdiction. The courts of
the signatory parties shall have jurisdiction to enforce against any person, public or
private corporation, or other entity, any and all provisions of this Article or of any
such order. The commission may bring an action in its own name in any such court
of competent jurisdiction to compel compliance with any provision of this Article, or
any rule or regulation issued pursuant thereto or of any such order, according to the
practice and procedure of the court.
Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961). See INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER
LAW (L. Teclaff & A. Utton eds. 1981).
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without, however, giving the Commission a supranational character. It
is desirable that the Commission would first of all formulate a general
plan, and this is generally the task of international bodies even with weak
advisory powers.
Classification and setting of standards are powers given to the Delaware
River Basin Commission93 (but contrast the Susquenhanna Commission,
which has weaker powers).94 The Lake Leman Convention of 1962, Art.
3,95 provides for the drafting of regulations, and the Franco-Swiss Genevese Aquifer Arrangement of 1977, Art. 16,96 for classification and
standard setting. In the Great Lakes Agreement of 19789' the Commission
has weaker powers, but the General and Specific Objectives in that treaty
are a form of classification, as are the limited use zones. The EEC
directives98 all have standards and lists of polluting substances.
The importance of classification is shown by the protection of drinking
water. One kind of classification is the "sole source" if it is the sole or
principal drinking water source for an area. Such designated protection
zones should include, if possible, the entire area of an aquifer shared by
two or more states or at least that part of it in which activity in one state
might cause pollution in another state or states.
Zero pollution may be the ideal objective, but it would be hard to
achieve and may not be necessary. It is now generally understood, however, that toxic pollutants have to be more stringently controlled than
other pollutants, and this is recognized in surface water provisions as,
e.g., in the Great Lakes Agreement of 1978. 99 It is even more important
for groundwater because of the enduring nature of such pollution, and
the EEC Council Directive of 1979 on the Protection of Groundwater
Against Pollution Caused by Certain Substances" exemplifies the concern, with its Lists I and II of prohibited and limited discharges, similar
to the "black" and "grey" lists in marine conventions.
Because groundwater pollution often originates on land with no actual
water use involved, it was argued that the Commission should have the
93. Id.
94. Susquehana River Basin Compact, Pub. L. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970). See INTERNATIONAL
GROUNDWATER LAW, supra note 93.
95. Convention on Protection of Lake Leman Waters Against Pollution, Nov. 16, 1962, FranceSwitzerland, O.E.C.D. 418 (1978).
96. Arrangement relating to the Franco-Swiss Genevese aquifer, Sept. 6, 1977, France-Switzerland. See INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW, supra note 93.
97. Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, 1978, United States-Canada, 30 U.S.T. 1383,
T.I.A.S No. 9257.
98. Proposal for Council Directive on Water Pollution from Wood Pulp Mills (20 Jan. 1975). 18
O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 90) 2, 2.5 (1975).
99. Supra note 98, at Art. V.
100. Council Directive on the Protection of Groundwater against Pollution Caused by Dangerous
Substances (17 Dec. 1979). O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 20) 43; 26.1 (1980).
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power to establish protective zones in which land use is regulated to
control the entry of pollutants. Land use concepts, such as the "limited
use zone," should be employed, whereby specific contaminating activities
such as waste disposal would be limited to specific areas so as to contain
the most polluting activities within the smallest possible area and thereby
isolate them from areas of natural recharge value. 1 ' The prospect of an
international agency having land use responsibilities, however, caused
considerable discomfort among the members of the Working Group. This
touches the most sensitive nerves of territorial integrity. One participant
said, "Be careful of intruding into the national territory" and "Are we
going too far?"
The concepts of "limited use zones" and "sole source" are really
counterparts to each other. The sole source designation excludes polluting
activities from the vicinity of the source of drinking water, and limited
use zones confines contaminating activities to limited areas. Limited use
zones are provided for in the Great Lakes Agreement of 1978.102 The
Finland-Sweden Agreement of 1971 on Frontier Rivers 0 3 (which pertains
to groundwater also) contains a list of factories and other installations
which may not be constructed without specific permission. The concept
of zones is well known in municipal law, e.g., the Swiss Federal Law
of 1971,"° which empowers the cantons to establish protective zones.
An outstanding example nearer home is the Long Island 208 Plan, 0 5
which divides Nassau and Suffolk counties into eight management zones,
each with its own water quality objectives and land use guidelines.
It should be noted, though, that most political bodies would be very
reluctant to give up the power to regulate land use. "oUnlike agreements
concerning surface waters where contamination can have a direct and
immediate effect on an economic system, the contamination of an aquifer
from land use is not as readily observed, and does not seem as urgent.
Therefore, there is less incentive for a Party to give up this planning
power.
The necessity for monitoring and continued supervision goes without
101. L. Teclaff & E. Teclaff, supra note 54, at 629.
102. Supra note 98, at Art. IV.
103. Agreement concerning Frontier Rivers, Dec. 15, 1971, Finland-Sweden, 825 U.N.T.S. 272
(1972).
104. Federal law on . . . pollution (Switzerland 1971). 11Feville federale 909 (1971).
105. §208 of the U.S. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1288(b)(2)(G) (Act of June 30,
1948, ch. 758, Titles -V, as added Oct. 18, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500 §2, 86 Stat. 816 and Dec.
27, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217 §§39-41, 5, 91 Stat. 1581), gives states power to engage in areawide planning for wastewater pollution control. See Tripp & Jaffe, Preventing Groundwater Pollution:
Toward a Coordinated Strategy to Protect Critical Recharge Zones, 3 HARV. ENTVL. L. REV. I,
43-46 (1979).
106. See ARSANJANI, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF INTERNAL RESOURCES: A STUDY OF LAW AND
POLICY 61 (1981).
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saying. Monitoring is expressly provided for in the following agreements
and directives: Great Lakes Agreement of 1978, Art. VI(1)(m); Rhine
Chlorides Convention of 1976, Art. 12; Franco Swiss Genevese Aquifer
Arrangement, Art. 16; EED Titanium Dioxide Directive of 1978 (especially on crossfrontier pollution); EEC Drinking Water Directive of 1975,
Art. 6; and EEC Groundwater Directive of 1979, Arts. 8, 9, and 16.
A contingency plan is provided for in the Great Lakes Agreement, Art.
VI (1)(i); also in the U.S. Clean Water Act, revamped in the Superfund
legislation (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980). 107
Cleanup is very important in groundwater pollution and is recognized
as established in U. S. federal law for oil and hazardous pollution of
surface waters. The Superfund legislation provides for financing not only
of water cleanup, but also of contaminated land which may present a
pollution hazard. The Superfund has already been used for the cleanup
of groundwater contamination in several states.'o8 Financial responsibility
for defective operation of a groundwater recharge station is also established in the Franco-Swiss Genevese Aquifer Arrangement of 1977, Art.
18; and the Rhine Chlorides Convention of 1976, Art. 7, also provides
for a financing plan, the cost of which is to be prorated among the Parties.
Enforcement is left to the contracting Parties in accordance with the
general enforcement of provisions of this agreement. A similar arrangement is quite common in federal law, as in the U. S. Clean Water Act 1"
and in the Swiss federal law on pollution of 1971, Art. 2. "' It is also to
be found in the EEC Council directives, which leave implementation to
the member states, and in the Rhine Chlorides Convention of 1976, Arts.
3 and 12.
ARTICLE XI-PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
I. Upon a determination that there is an imminent or actual
contamination of groundwater, the Commission may, after
notification to the respective Governments, declare a public
health emergency.
II. On the basis of the declaration, which shall not last for
more than - days, the Commission shall have authority to:
107. Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, as amended by Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-483 (1981), 94 Stat. 2767 [codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§9601-57 (Supp. V 1981)].
108. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1981). See Dycus, Development of National Groundwater Protection
Policy, 11 ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 211, 265 (1984).
109. 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (1981).
110. Federal Law on Pollution FF I1 (1971) 909.
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A. investigate the area of imminent or actual contamination;
B. alert the affected parts of the imminent or actual health
danger; and
C. undertake, in consultation with the Parties, all necessary measures to eliminate the imminent or actual health
danger.
COMMENT ON ARTICLE XI
National Standards of Public Health
I. The problem of defining what constitutes a "public health emergency" caused by contamination of transboundary groundwater is best
illustrated by examination of the double ambiguity over (a) what is an
unacceptable level of "public health" and (b) when is the probability of
a drop in the level of "public health" sufficiently serious to constitute an
emergency.
Between nations there will invariably be differences as to what levels
of general public health the respective populations find acceptable. These
variations make the protection of transboundary groundwaters more difficult and complex. Public health measures cannot be unilaterally imposed. Therefore, where pollution in one nation will affect the public
health of the citizens of another, as noted in Article X, there is a need
for cooperative action. This is particularly so in emergency situations.
Mutual Agreement as to What Constitutes an Emergency
Because of the nature of groundwater, which makes the location and
extent of contamination difficult to predict, the constant changes in the
types of toxic and dangerous substances to which the environment is
exposed, and our evolving knowledge of the relationships of exposure to
health, it is difficult to anticipate in a treaty what will constitute an
emergency upon which parties can agree absent the facts of specific
situations. The water quality section, Article X, of the treaty calls for the
development of background data on water quality and the designation of
critical public health areas that, because of the nature and source of their
groundwater, are particularly vulnerable. This emergency provision simply empowers the Commission to act quickly at times when speed is
important in preventing irreversible or extreme damages. Cooperation in
scooping up and containing contaminated soils immediately after a toxics
spill may, for instance, prevent contamination from ever reaching groundwater. The immediate provision of the alternative sources of drinking
water may prevent serious and widespread damage to health. This article
is intended to provide authority to act quickly when there is agreement
that such action is needed.

July 1985]

THE IXTAPA DRAFT AGREEMENT

ARTICLE XII-ADMINISTRATION
I. Administration of transboundary groundwater use in that
portion of a Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area
located within the territory of a Party to this agreement
shall be within the jurisdiction and responsibility of that
Party or its political subdivisions, as appropriate.
II. The Commission shall monitor the measures undertaken
by each Party to implement this agreement, including measures decided upon by the Commission.
III. The Commission shall biennially conduct a review of the
measures undertaken within each Party's territory and shall
issue a biennial report containing its assessment of the
adequacy and effectiveness of programs of use, protection
and control of the Parties' shared groundwaters with particular attention to any Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area. To that end each Party shall furnish the
Commission through its National Section the relevant data
and information on which it must base its report in accordance with the reporting scheme provided by the Commission.
IV. After investigation, notice, and hearing the Commission
is empowered to adopt, promulgate, and from time to time
amend and repeal such rules, regulations, and standards
as may be necessary within the scope of this agreement,
which become binding on the Parties if not disapproved
by one of the Governments within 180 days of issuance.
V. The settlement of all disputes which may arise out of the
observance, implementation, and interpretation of this
agreement shall be entrusted to the Commission.
COMMENT ON ARTICLE XII
The actual administration of transboundary groundwater uses within
the territory of a Party would be under its jurisdiction and its appropriate
political sub-divisions. This is designed to minimize impinging on the
territorial integrity of the Parties. The United States Supreme Court in
the equitable apportionment case of Nebraska v. Wyoming spoke in support
of giving each State "full freedom of intrastate administration of her share
of the water. .

..

"and "internal administration for each of the States. "111

The mandatory duties of the Commission are monitoring the actions
of the Parties under the agreement and issuing biennial reports. Basic to
the monitoring process of the Commission is the continuing acquisition
111. 325 U.S. 589, 599 (1945).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

of information obtained from the metering of wells. "There must be a
system of measurement of withdrawals from wells. . . .Records must
be kept of withdrawals over a period of time," ' 2 and the Commission
must be able to ensure that withdrawals do not exceed allocated amounts
in the Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Areas which are based
on calculated mining programs or a determined sustained yield in terms
of water quality and water quantity." 3
The annual report would establish, among other things, whether a Party
is meeting its responsibilities under this Agreement. These mandatory
duties would seek to ensure that each Party lives within the total water
budget allocated to it, whether allocated by uses or volume.
Paragraph
IV gives the Commission the necessary power to promulgate rules after
investigation, notice, and hearing. The idea of notice and hearing at the
international level is somewhat uncommon, but does allow the input of
interested parties which can be useful in formulating policy. This follows
the example of the Delaware River Basis Compact which provides in
Section 5.2:
After such investigation, notice and hearing the commission may
adopt and from time to time amend and repeal rules, regulations and
standards to control such future pollution and abate existing pollution,
and to require such treatment of sewage, industrial or other waste
within a time reasonable for the construction of the necessary works,
as may be required to protect the public health or to preserve the
waters of the basin for uses in accordance with the comprehensive
plan.
Paragraph IV provides that the rules and regulations of the Commission
shall become effective and binding on the Parties if not disapproved by
one Party within 180 days of issuance. If a nation has left regulation up
to its political subdivisions, this type of consent might not be sufficient
and difficult to achieve. Some commentators felt that "180 days is inadequate. "
Other sections of this Article which would spell out procedures to be
used in the event of irreconcilable differences between the members of
the Commission might also be desirable. Perhaps other powers of the
Commission pertaining more explicitly to groundwater. e.g., power to
sue, should be enumerated (see Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Sec.
5.3.(b)). As we have seen in the comments to Article X, supra, the
Delaware River Basin Compact gives the Commission itself extensive
enforcement power in Section 5.4.
The challenges to enforcement should not be underestimated. Cummings illustrates two difficulties in limiting groundwater use with an
112. Clark, supra note 42, at 159.
113. Id.
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example from the Costa de Hermosillo, located in the northern state of
Sonora, Mexico. The Costa de Hermosillo is one of Mexico's most
productive irrigation districts, and its sole source of water for irrigation
in groundwater is a coastal aquifer. Years of groundwater mining resulted
in falling water tables, which, in turn, resulted in the intrusion of seawater
into the aquifer.
In an effort to limit the destructive effects of seawater intrusion,
the Water Resources Ministry (Secretaria de Recursos Hidraulicos,
SRH) limited each farmer's pumping rate and, to enforce this limit,
required the installation of meters on all pumps. A few years passed,
water tables continued to fall, and seawater intrusion continued despite apparent "compliance" with SRH limits on groundwater use:
innovative farmers had discovered myriad of ways of bypassing
meters. By the mid-1970 the seawater intrusion problem had worsened considerably, thereby forcing the SRH to adopt relatively dramatic management/enforcement policies. Exorbitant fines were imposed
on pumping in excess of limits. For enforcement, three measures of
water use were devised: the amount recorded on the meter; the amount
implied by electricity use (each meter was put on a separate electric
meter); and the amount implied by the number of acres irrigated by
the farmer. Pump limits were then compared with that amount of
water implied by the higher of those three measures. 14
Cummings concludes that this example illustrates two aspects of transboundary groundwaters. First, users in an unregulated environment have
no incentives for conserving the common property resource stock-private incentives are to pump water so long as the value created by water
exceeds pumping costs. He suggests this can be corrected through economic incentives such as pumping charges under a scarcity or corrective
tax concept. He concludes secondly, that the Commission must have
regulatory/enforcement powers that apply to all of the numerous individual pumpers, and it must monitor water use of all users." 5
ARTICLE XIII-EXISTING RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
Nothing in this Agreement shall be deemed to diminish the
rights and obligations of the Parties as set forth in existing
agreements between the Parties.
ARTICLE XIV-AMENDMENT
This Agreement may be amended by agreement of the Parties.
114. Muys, Cummings & Burke, supra note 18, at 151.
115. Id.
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ARTICLE XV-ENTRY INTO FORCE
This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature by the
duly authorized representatives of the Parties.
ARTICLE XVI-RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
COMMENT ON ARTICLE XVI
I. The question of dispute resolution is of particular importance and
is one that has to be tailored to the specific needs of the particular parties.
Therefore, this article flags the need to address the question, but leaves
open the design of specific procedures since they need to be considered
in the context of specific settings. Dispute resolution is "particularly
urgent" because the lack of effective procedures may contribute to "delay
of important projects, suspension of expensive works
under construction
16
•..and inability to deal with very real hazards."'
Due to the elemental nature of water to the well-being of all human
beings, disputes over water use should be settled in a quick and efficient
manner. This point is emphasized in the Third Report to the International
Law Commission on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses." 7 Numerous examples of specific methods are provided in the report.
II. Some agreements provide a special procedure to negotiate a settlement to a dispute.
The Danube Navigation Convention of 1948 provides for the creation of a special body composed of one representative of each party and
one additional member chosen by the President of the Commission. " 8
B. Another alternative is the appointment of an umpire on either
a permanent or ad hoc basis. One agreement provides for a permanent
umpire and a deputy, with special arbitrators who are appointed to handle
specific disputes. "9
C. The Helsinki Rules contain a model for a conciliation commission. "o
116. Third Report on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. Int'l L.
Comm'n, 34 U.N. GAOR; UN Doc. A/CN.4/348, at paras. 468-94 (1981).
117. Id.
118. Art. 45, 33 U.N.T.S. 196; TEXTS & TREATY PROVISIONS, supra note 28, at 420, 422.
119. Art. 70-72, Frontier Treaty between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic
of Germany of 8 April 1960, TEXT & TREATY PROVISIONS, supra note 28, at 757, 761-62.
120. Report of the Committee on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers (London, Int'l
Law Association, 1967).
MODEL RULES FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF A DISPUTE
Article I
The members of the Commission, including the President, shall be appointed by
the States concerned.
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III. The Third Report to the International Commission succinctly surveys international practice:
When an accommodation is not achieved at the operating level,
higher review must take place. This review can still be by water
resources professionals, such as the members, or deputies, of the
system States' international watercourse commission. Such arrangements are not uncommon in current system State practice.
An additional "professional" review may be obtained by reference
of the question to a technical commission of inquiry ....
As a further
device to forestall the matter's hardening into a formal dispute be-

tween the parties, one or more additional "echelons" of review may
be built into the system States' arrangements, such as a diplomatic
commission specially constituted for the purpose. System States have,
in particular agreements, employed a variety of accommodation
mechanisms. Belgium and Germany combined diplomatic and technical representation in one joint administrative commission for the
purpose of accommodating differences. Such a separate forum could
be designated to function prior to the traditional "referral to the
Governments," which may mean that the matter will then become
a formal dispute.
After "referral to the Governments" of any difference that has not
been resolved by the institutional machinery set up by the system
Article 11
If the States concerned cannot agree on these appointments, each State shall
appoint two members. The members thus appointed shall choose one more member
who shall be the President of the Commission. If the appointed members do not
agree, the member-president shall be appointed, at the request of any State concerned, by the President of the International Court of Justice, or, if he does not
make the appointment, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article III
The membership of the Commission should include persons who, by reason of
their special competence, are qualified to deal with disputes concerning international
drainage basins.
Article IV
If a member of the Commission abstains from performing his office or is unable
to discharge his responsibilities, he shall be replaced by the procedure set out in
article I or article II of this annex, according to the manner in which he was originally
appointed. If, in the case of:
(1) A member originally appointed under article 1, the States fail to agree as to
a replacement, or
(2) A member originally appointed under article II, the State involved fails to
replace the member,
a replacement shall be chosen, at the request of any State concerned, by the President
of the International Court of Justice or, if he does not choose the replacement, by
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article V
In the absence of agreement to the contrary between the parties, the conciliation
Commission shall determine the place of its meetings and shall lay down its own
procedure.
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States for the handling of their shared water resources affairs, the
usual next step is direct negotiation between the parties at the political
level. The project or programme at issue may be of such importance
that even at this stage it may be prudent for the system States to
arrange for some or all operations to continue, pending final resolution of the matter.
Failing settlement by high-level negotiation, the parties are, of
course, free to take the dispute to the International Court of Justice.
The International Court of Justice may in appropriate circumstances
indicate provisional measures, which could serve the parties' interests
in avoiding delay or disruption of critical water-related activities, or
preclude irreversible harm. The parties are also free to refer the matter
for adjudication to any other appropriate tribunal.
The fundamental requirement, in accordance with the Charter and
the rules of contemporary international law, is settlement by peaceful
means. In addition to resolution by means of negotiation, enquiry
and adjudication, the parties may choose, among other peaceful
means, conciliation,
arbitration or the assistance of regional agencies
12 1
or arrangements.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being
duly authorized, have signed this Agreement.
DONE AT
, this
day of
., one thousand nine hundred and

121. Third Report, supra note 117, at 324.

